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Abstract
A pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system requires a balance between the benefits paid
to pensioners and the contributions made by active workers. The decline in fertility
rates and the increase in longevity in China will lead to a substantial increase in the
old-age dependency ratio, raising serious concerns about the long-term sustainability
of the Chinese pension system.
This thesis provides the first estimate of the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pen-
sion system in urban areas and is based on two actuarial balance methodologies. The
first is the Swedish solvency ratio, which is based on verifiable facts. The second is the
United States’ actuarial balance indicator, which takes into account projected demo-
graphic and economic structures. Both methodologies show that the Chinese pension
system, in its current form, is unsustainable. Two factors, namely the one-child pol-
icy and the urbanization process, that affect the sustainability of the Chinese pension
system are analysed. Population projections under different demographic structures
are provided using the cohort component method, and an automatic balancing mecha-
nism is designed in order to restore the sustainability of this pension system. The main
finding is that the one-child policy is harmful to the system’s sustainability. Further-
more, all scenarios studied show there is an urgent need to introduce mechanisms that
will guarantee long-term sustainability of the system. The analysis of the urbanization
process shows that demographic changes due to rural-urban migration will have an
enormous impact on the Chinese PAYG pension system. Contrary to the current public
hypothesis that a huge inflow of a working-age population will restore the demographic
balance between contributors and pensioners, the rapid urbanization process will re-
sult in a higher old-age dependency ratio after 2050. Overall, urbanization worsens the
long-term sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The vast majority of countries around the world including China chose the pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) systems at the establishment of their public pensions and keep this form till
now (OECD, 2015). The PAYG pension system works in the way that current active
workers pay the benefits for current retirees. It requires a balance between the expendi-
tures paid on pensions and the income from contributions. The PAYG system is facing
severe challenges in the context of global ageing, which is caused by the increasing
longevity and decreasing fertilities. Longevity is, of course, a good thing as people are
living longer now than ever before. However, the duration of the payment periods is
longer in the respect of pensions, which will lead to the increase of the expenditures in
the system. The life expectancy at birth1 around the world is 46.81 years old in 1950,
1Life expectancy at birth is defined as the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life (United Nations,
2015).
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and it is 70.47 now, which means people now are living more than 20 years longer
than they were 60 years ago. Furthermore, United Nations (2015) projects the life
expectancy will keep raising and reach 81.53 in 2080. On the other side, the world av-
erage fertility rate keeps decreasing from 4.96 (children per woman) in 1950 to current
2.51. United Nations (2015) also projects that the fertility rate will keep decreasing in
the future to 2.05 in 2080. The decline of the fertilities will lead to the shrinking of the
working-age population, and hence reduce the income from contributions in a PAYG
pension system. A decline in the fertility together with an increase in the longevity will
result in a substantial increase in the old-age dependency ratio2, it thus leads to seri-
ous concerns about the sustainability of PAYG pension systems. The challenges faced
by China is more severe, as the one-child policy which was conducted in the 1980s
has led to the rapid decline in the fertility rates, and at the same time, the first cohort
of baby boomers who were born in the 1950s are approaching retirement now. Thus,
the analysis of the current PAYG pension system together with the presentation for
corresponding pension reforms becomes not only necessary but also urgent in China.
This thesis provides the first estimate of the long-term sustainability of Chinese PAYG
pension system. While previous literature usually focuses on the short-term liquidity,
i.e. each year’s pension expenditures minus each year’s income from contributions.
This thesis also analyses how the current political and social events in China affect the
long-term sustainability of its pension system. This is the first time that the impact
of one-child policy has been analysed on the pension system, while the previous stud-
ies always focus on its impact on the economic growth and children’s health. Based
2The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of elder people divided by the number of
working-age population.
2
on the cohort component method, I analyse the impact of one-child policy by adjust-
ing the total fertility rates in the population projections under different demographic
scenarios. We also set up automatic balance mechanism (ABM) under the different de-
mographic structures to restore the sustainability of the Chinese pension system. The
ABM provides us with the optimal paths of the contribution rate, retirement age and
the indexation of pensions, which give us a clear view of how the different fertility
policies could affect the sustainability of the Chinese pension system. Along with the
country’s fast economic growth, the implications of the urbanization process has been
widely discussed in the areas of environmental health and people’s living standards.
However, its impact on the pension system has never been investigated so far. Thus,
I analyse the impact of the urbanization on the Chinese pension system in this the-
sis by introducing a rural to urban migration rates into the cohort component model.
The comparison of the ABM between the migration scenario and the baseline scenario
(without the rural to urban migration) shows the impact of the urbanization process on
the long-term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system. A brief description
of each chapter in this thesis are described in the following, and the structure of the
thesis is given at the end of this chapter.
A pension is an important part of a country’s social security system. It helps to prevent
poverty among elderly people and ensures decent living standards after their retire-
ments. The sustainability of a pension system has drawn much attention around the
world in the context of the recent trend of global ageing. A lot of countries has already
conducted some pension reforms in order to obtain the adequacy and sustainability of
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their pension systems. Chapter 2 introduces some basic concepts in the pension system
and gives examples in a global context.
Chapter 3 focuses on the pension systems in China. It describes the whole evolu-
tion of the entire public pension system from its beginning to current status at first, and
then focus on the PAYG pension system in our analysis. This chapter also assesses
the current problems in the Chinese pension system and discusses the future directions
of pension reforms in China. Pension reforms in China have drawn much attention
around the world recently, after the country’s rapid economic growth. The problems
such as ‘empty accounts’ and severe ageing have led to serious concerns in the pension
system. This chapter shows that the analysis of the pension system in China and the
implementation of the pension reforms to restore the sustainability are demographi-
cally urgent, economically necessary and socially and politically essential.
With the objective of evaluating the current financial status of the Chinese pension
system and providing the possible parametric reforms, I analyse the long-term sustain-
ability of the system using two different actuarial methodologies in the fourth chapter.
One is Swedish actuarial balance sheet model, which is based on verifiable facts. The
Swedish model assumes a steady state, i.e. neither the demographic nor the economic
structures of the pension system will change in the future. It analyses the long-term
sustainability of the pension system in its current circumstances. The other is U.S.
actuarial balance indicator model, which involves projections on future demographic
and economic changes. The U.S. model calculates the difference between the incomes
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and the expenditures of the pension system in the next 75 years. The evolution of the
demographic and economic changes is taken into account during its calculation.
As mentioned before, the rapid decline in the fertility rates in China was mainly due
to the one-child policy3, which was introduced in 1979 by the Chinese government
with the aim of controlling the country’s rapid population growth. The consequences
of the one-child policy on the Chinese future economic growth have been widely dis-
cussed during the last three decades after its implementation. The contributions of the
one-child policy to the country’s economic growth have been confirmed (McElroy and
Yang, 2000; Li et al., 2005; Li and Zhang, 2007). However, some authors have raised
concerns that the one-child policy would lead to the serious labour shortage which
is not compatible with the country’s objective of economic advancement (Bloom and
Williamson, 1998; Howden and Zhou, 2014). In terms of the pension system, the de-
mographic change caused by the one-child policy will also affect the sustainability of
a PAYG pension system. The decrease in the number of contributors and the relative
increase in the number of pensioners, i.e. an increase in the old-age dependency ratio
would lead to deficits in the Chinese pension system. With this in mind, I analyse the
impact of the one-child policy on the sustainability of the Chinese pension system in
the fifth chapter.
The fast economic growth in China has led to the rapid urbanization, which has drawn
a lot of attention in the world. The urbanization rate (defined as the number of popu-
3One-child policy is a compulsory policy that does not allow to have more than one child in any
Chinese family. Refer to Banister (1987), Chen and Kols (1982) and Lin and Zhou (1984) for more
detailed information on one-child policy.
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lation living in the urban area divided by the total population in percentage) in China
has expanded from 12% to 50% in 6 decades between 1950 and 2011, while the same
transition took 150 years to occur in Europe and 210 years in Latin America and the
Caribbean. The urbanization is linked with sustainable development. In the aspect of
advantages, urbanization can facilitate economic and social development by concen-
trating the human resources in the urban area (Cohen, 2006; Gru¨bler and Fisk, 2013).
However, rapid and unplanned urban growth also leads to some disadvantages, such as
environmental degradation and the inequalities between the urban poor and the urban
rich citizens (Angel et al., 2011b; Balk et al., 2009; Fink et al., 2014). The key reason
behind the fast urbanization in China is the change of demographic structures due to
the rural to urban migration (Dyson, 2011), and the demographic change will have an
enormous impact on the PAYG pension system. Thus, I analyse the impact of the ur-
banization process on the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system in urban
areas in the sixth chapter.
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 describes the pensions in a global context. This
chapter explains some basic concepts in the pension system and overviews the pension
systems and recent pension reforms around the world. After that, Chapter 3 focuses
on the pension system in China. It describes the evolution of the entire Chinese pen-
sion system at first, and then reviews the current problems of the pension system and
summarizes the future directions of the pension reforms in China. Chapter 4 uses two
different actuarial methodologies to analyse the long-term sustainability of the current
Chinese PAYG pension system. An actuarial balance sheet for China is compiled based
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on Swedish method with a solvency ratio (SR) derived from the assets and the liabili-
ties for China. Then an actuarial balance indicator (AB) for China based on the United
States’ method is provided, which analyses the sustainability of the Chinese pension
system over the next 75 years. Following that in Chapter 5, we analyse the implications
of the one-child policy on the sustainability of the pension system. Population projec-
tions under different demographic structures regarding the various fertility policies are
provided in this chapter. We also set up an ABM for the Chinese PAYG pension system
in order to restore the sustainability. The implications of the urbanization process on
the sustainability of the Chinese pension system is analysed in Chapter 6 by adjusting
the net migration rates for the impact of rural to urban migration. Finally, Chapter 7
concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Pensions in a Global Context
This chapter describes the pension system in a global context and discusses the pension
reforms around the world. A Pension is the income people can receive after their re-
tirement to replace the earnings from employment, and its design should following two
principle objectives – pension adequacy and financial sustainability (Sullivan, 2004).
The target of pension adequacy is to prevent elder people from poverty and secure a
decent living standard after their retirement. At the same time, the paramount objec-
tive of a pension system is to obtain the financial sustainability in the long term, i.e.
to achieve the financial balance between the income from contributions and the ex-
penditures of pension payments. Financial sustainability is very important to a PAYG
pension system in the current context of rapid ageing, since the increase of longevity
and the decreasing of fertility will lead to the imbalance in the demographic structures.
This chapter also discusses the actions taken around the world during the pension re-
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forms.
2.1 Introduction
Almost all the countries have pension systems to protect elder people from poverty in
their later life (Edward, 2007). The retired people account for a substantial share of
the total population, and these proportions are continually growing4. For example, the
share of individuals aged 60 and over has increased from 8% of the total world pop-
ulation in 1950 to 12.3% by 2015, and it is projected to reach 25.9% in 2080 (United
Nations, 2015). For most of these elderly people, the pension benefits constitute the
main source for their incomes after retirement. Furthermore, the safety of a pension
system is important to a country’s public finance. According to OECD (2015), the
public pension expenditures account for 18% of total public spending across OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, and it repre-
sents 9% of the total GDP. The deficits in a pension system might lead to the increase
of a country’s total public expenditures and hence raise the government debt, which
in turn influence the global economy as a whole. The projections from OECD (2015)
show that pension expenditures in the vast majority of the countries will keep increas-
ing in the proportion of their GDPs until 20505. Thus, the Green Paper and the White
Paper (European Commission, 2010, 2012) have encouraged the European countries to
4The share of elderly people in the percentage of total population in the world is presented in Ap-
pendix A.
5The public expenditure on pensions in the percentage of GDP in the world from 2010 to 2050 is
shown in Appendix B.
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consolidate a solidary and safety pension system in the Europe, and OECD also put the
reforms of pension systems among their member and partner countries on the agenda
(OECD, 2015, 2016b). The pension reforms around the world aim to achieve a more
financially sustainable PAYG pension system, which could also provide the adequate
incomes for individuals in their old age.
China, as a partner of OECD and a member of Group of Twenty (G20), is one of
the largest economies in the world. The pension reforms in China have drawn much
attention around the world recently, because the country’s economy is growing fast,
and accounts for more shares in the world. The adequacy and sustainability of the
Chinese pension system are meaningful to the world. The projected change in pension
expenditures (% of GDP) in China will increase by 5.8% until 2050, while the change
is only 1.1% for the average level of OECD countries (see Table B.1 in Appendix B). In
turn, to better analyse the pension system in China, it is necessary to give an overview
of the pension systems and the pension reforms in a global context.
The later contents in this chapter are organised as the following. Section 2.2 presents
some basic concepts in the pension system and gives some examples in a global con-
text. This section also explains the main objectives for a pension system, in order to
help readers better understand the recent pension reforms taken around the world. Fol-
lowing that, Section 2.3 describes the pension reforms which have been taken recently
around the world. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Pension Schemes and Objectives
2.2.1 Pension Schemes
A Pension is the income people can receive after their retirement to replace the earn-
ings from employment (OECD, 2015). A pension is needed because people’s capacity
to work and their ability to earn the income decline in later life. Germany was the first
country who introduced a public pension system in 1889, then followed by, Denmark
in 1891, Britain in 1908, Australia in 1909, and America in 1935 (Sullivan, 2004). The
coverage of the pension system in the past was usually very narrow, it only provided
benefits to the elderly people whose incomes after retirement were relatively low, and
mainly aimed to prevent poverty in the whole society. However, nowadays a lot of
countries in the world have been able to set up the pension systems to cover a broader
range of people with the objective to secure a decent living standard after their re-
tirement (Blackburn, 2003; Edward, 2007). Except from pensions, people might also
have other sources of income after their retirements, such as income from properties,
savings and financial investments, or even financial support from their family mem-
bers. However, the difference between a pension and other incomes is that pensions
provide a stream of regular payments guaranteed for their later life. The mechanisms
to provide retired people with regular incomes or allow those people of working-age to
be engaged in their future incomes after their retirements are called pension schemes
(European Commission, 2015a). Without pension schemes, the only way that workers
can finance their consumption after retirement is to save money during the period of
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employment. Due to the uncertainty of life expectancy, it is difficult for the workers
to decide how much should be saved for the future (Gillion, 2000). Some of them
would over save to avoid the exhausting of savings before they die. On the contrary,
the others would not save enough for their later life. Pension schemes could overcome
this shortage by linking retirement benefit in return for contributions made during the
working years.
Defined-Benefit (DB) and Defined-Contribution (DC)
Pension schemes can be classified into two types (Bodie et al., 1988): defined bene-
fit (DB) and defined contribution (DC). Under a DC scheme, each employee has an
account into which they make regular contributions, and pension is dependent on the
amount of money they contributed and the return of the accumulation in the account
(Kruse, 1995; Ippolito, 1995; Choi et al., 2002). In a DB scheme, the pension benefit
is determined by a formula which takes into account the number of contribution years
and the participant’s wages or salary (Harrison and Sharpe, 1983; Exley et al., 1997).
Almost every country chose DB scheme at the establishment of their pension systems
and most of them keep the form till now (see Table 2.1), because the redistribution
of the contributions is easier to be controlled by the government under a DB scheme.
While the contributions are directly linked with benefits under a DC scheme, and redis-
tribution of the welfare among elder people in the whole society is relatively difficult
to be attained (Sullivan, 2004). According to Bodie et al. (1988) and Poterba et al.
(2007), the pension benefit is defined in a DB scheme. The amount of pension from
DB schemes is predetermined by the certain benefit formulae, while the contributions
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are variable. Contribution levels could be changed by authorities under DB schemes
to meet the financing requirements. Thus, DB schemes provide fixed benefits based
on variable contributions. On the contrary, the amount of contribution is defined under
a DC scheme. DC schemes provide variable pensions based upon fixed contributions.
Because the rule of DC schemes regulates the amount that must be contributed into the
scheme, but not the pension benefit that will be paid out.
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and Funded
Either DB or DC schemes could be financed in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) plan or funded
plan (Bodie et al., 1988). The PAYG DC is the so-called notional defined contribution
(NDC) scheme (Cichon, 1999; Holzmann et al., 2006). In a PAYG plan, contributions
made by the current workers are paid out immediately as pension benefits to the pen-
sioners. Each generation pays the pensions for the preceding generation (Breyer, 1989;
Brunner, 1994). Technically, there should not be any storage of fund in the PAYG
plan6. In a funded pension plan, contributions are paid into an account and accumulate
and earn interest at a certain rate (Sullivan, 2004). In this plan, each generation pro-
vides their own incomes, which is independent of preceding or following generations
(Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). In other words, pensions for current retirees are paid
by current active workers under a PAYG plan, whereas current workers finance their
own pensions in a funded plan. Because PAYG plans finance pension benefits from
the contribution of current workers, they can begin paying the pension at the begin-
ning of the establishment of the system. On the contrary, a disadvantage of the funded
6In practice, there may be a buffer fund in the PAYG plan. The buffer fund is generated by the cash
surplus during a period and is reserved to pay for the cash deficits for the uncertainty in the future.
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plans is that it has to wait many years from the time the system is set up before enough
funds can be provided to pay for the pension benefits (Siebert et al., 1997). Thus, the
vast majority of countries choose the PAYG plan at the beginning period of their pen-
sion system and keep this form of pension system till now (see Table 2.1). However,
risks do exist during the operation of a PAYG plan (Mylonas and Maisonneuve, 1999).
Since in a PAYG plan, the benefits that current pensioners receive rely on the promise
of the following generations to pay them the pensions until death. Thus the main risk
exists in a PAYG pension plan is arising from the change in the ratio between contri-
butions and pensions, which is determined by the relative size of the two generations.
Demographic risk emerges when the population is shrinking in a PAYG plan. While in
a funded pension plan, the main risks are the investment risks (such as the change of
interest rate and inflation rate) and the challenge for the increasing of life expectancy
(Kaganovich and Zilcha, 2012). At the time of retirement, the funds in a funded plan
will transfer into a life-long annuity. The initial annuity payment is calculated accord-
ing to the life expectancy at that time, but pension in payment is not adjusted to the
future changes in life expectancy.
Table 2.1 shows the current type of the pension systems for some major economies
around the world. We can see, the vast majority of the countries have the PAYG DB
schemes in their current public pension system. The exceptions, who have the NDC
or Funded DC schemes now, all had the PAYG DB scheme before, and recently trans-
ferred to other schemes through pension structure reforms. A transition from DB to DC
could shift the risk from the government to individuals, because in a DB scheme the
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benefit formula is predetermined by the government, while in a DC scheme the indi-
viduals take the main responsibility for their pension benefit. Thus, countries, such as
Chile, Sweden, Italy and so on, have reformed their pension structures to DC schemes.
Transitions to funded DC scheme might encourage participants to join the pension sys-
tem and pay the contributions on time. However, it also brings about some problems
(Holzmann, 2013). For example, the funded plan will enlarge the impact of investment
risks on the pension fund, and requires more administration costs for the management
of the pension fund. Alternatively, the transition to NDC still cannot solve the cur-
rent problem facing by PAYG scheme in the context of global ageing. Thus countries
are prudent with the structural reforms, since it will lead to additional administration
costs and a big impact on the current system (Holzmann et al., 2006, 2012). China has
introduced an individual account in the form of DC scheme in 1995, the scheme is de-
signed to be a funded plan in order to increase the labour mobility at that time (Details
for the individual accounts and its evolution are described in Chapter 3). So, current
pension schemes in China consists of two parts, PAYG DB and funded DC as shown
in Table 2.1. Besides a structural reform, a lot of the countries have conducted various
parametric reforms recently. Details about the pension reforms around the world are
described in Section 2.3.
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Table 2.1: Current type of the mandatory public pension systems
PAYG DB Funded DB NDC Funded DC
OECD members
Australia X
Austria X
Belgium X
Canada X
Chile X
Czech Republic X
Denmark X
Estonia X
Finland X
France X
Germany X
Greece X
Hungary X
Iceland X
Ireland X
Israel X
Italy X
Japan X
Korea X
Luxembourg X
Mexico X
Netherlands X
New Zealand X
Norway X
Poland X
Portugal X
Slovak Republic X
Slovenia X
Spain X
Sweden X
Switzerland X
Turkey X
United Kingdom X
United States X
Other major economies
Argentina X
Brazil X
China X X
India X
Indonesia X
Russian Federation X
Saudi Arabia X
South Africa X
Own source based on OECD (2015) and OECD country profiles.
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Pension Tiers – Traditional Three-Tier and World Bank Five-Tier
Pensions could also be classified by the different levels of organisers. In this case,
a pension system could fall into different tiers, namely public pension, occupational
pension, and personal pension (Sullivan, 2004; European Commission, 2015a).
The first tier is the public pension (Chand and Jaeger, 1996; Impavido, 2002), also
known as state pension, which are organised and operated by governments. They aim
to prevent poverty among the old-age population and to ensure that the workers’ in-
come are maintained after their retirement by linking the value of pension benefits to
earnings from employment. The vast majority of public pension schemes are operated
based on a PAYG DB plan, thus the cost of providing the pensions for retired workers
is met from the contributions of current workers in employment. In other words, public
pension schemes work in the way that redistributing income directly from workers to
pensioners. In addition, those workers currently in employment are willing to pay the
pensions for preceding generations based on the understanding that the next generation
will pay their pensions in the future.
The second tier is the occupational pension (Hannah, 1986; Sharpe and Treynor, 1977),
also known as company pension. It is organised and operated by an employer to pro-
vide pension benefits for its employees. It can be either set up as a trust fund running
by trustees or entrusted to a life insurance company. The contribution to this scheme
is usually from employees as well as their employer. It works like a welfare from
employer to benefit their employees, because the pensions paid out are usually tax-
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exempted. Occupational pension schemes are usually funded, and it can be either DB
or DC type.
The third tier is the private pension (Munnell, 1982; Shah, 1999), also called personal
pension. A private pension is one way that individuals can choose to save for their
retirement by investing in a pension plan from an insurance company. Private pensions
can only be operated under a funded DC scheme.
This thesis focus on the analysis of the first tier, i.e. public pensions, because it is
the basis of a country’s old-age social security and is usually mandatory. The second
and third tiers are supplements for the first-tier.
The World Bank has also introduced a five-tiers diversified classification for the pen-
sion system, based on the needs of target populations (Holzmann et al., 2008). The
five tiers are stated as below:
1. A non-contributory ‘zero tier’ extending some level of old-age income security
to all of the elderly. This tire is designed to be financed by local or national
governments. The objective of this tire is to alleviate poverty in order to provide
all the elder people with a minimal level of protection. It ensures that people with
low earnings during the employment or who has shorter career can be provided
with basic protection.
2. An appropriately sized mandatory ‘first tier’ with the objective of replacing some
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portion of lifetime pre-retirement income through contributions linked to earn-
ings. This tier secure the decent living standards for elderly people and protect
them from inappropriate planning due to the uncertainty of life expectancy and
unforeseeable risks of financial markets. It is typically financed by a PAYG plan,
thus it is subject to demographic risks.
3. A mandatory funded DC ‘second tier’ that typically provides privately-managed
individual savings accounts with independent investment management. It pro-
vides a wide range of options. People are free to choose investment portfolios
and investment managers, as well as the option for the withdrawal phase. Com-
pared to DB plan, this tier face more financial and agency risks due to the private
pension management. As mentioned before, it also subjects to the risk of the
high transaction and administration costs, and the longevity risks existing in the
DC plan as well.
4. A voluntary funded ‘third tier’, it can follow various types and take kinds of
forms. It could be employer-sponsored occupational pensions or individual sav-
ings as private pensions. The designed structure of this tier is relatively flexible
in nature. This tier compensates for the rigidities in the design of other tiers
stated before. However, it faces the similar risks as discussed in the second tier.
5. A ‘fourth tier’ can be either in the form of informal support, such as family
support or incomes from property investment or in the form of formal social
programs, such as health care or housing. The necessity of this tier is dependent
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on the design and implementation of other tiers.
The World Bank’s five-tier classification is different from the traditional three-tier clas-
sification. It is more like a recommendation for the future reforms than a classification
of the current pension systems in the world. The five-tier model addresses the impor-
tance of private pensions compared to the traditional three-tier model and designs it as
mandatory in a pension system. While in the traditional three-tier model, the private
pensions and occupational pensions are usually voluntary to participate. It also en-
courages governments to set up a non-contributory tier to prevent poverty among the
elderly people and addresses the need for informal support to supplement the original
pensions. In the sense of the World Bank’s five-tier model, this thesis focus on the
analysis of the mandatory ‘first tier’.
2.2.2 Pension Objectives
The original design of pension schemes or the following pension reforms both aim
to achieve the two principal objectives: adequacy and sustainability (European Com-
mission, 2010; OECD, 2015, 2016b). The purpose of adequacy is to prevent poverty
among the elderly and secure a decent standard of living after their retirement (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010). It means people who are participating in the labour market
should have the opportunity to build up sufficient pension provisions during their work-
ing life by contributing to pension schemes. Pension systems should be set up in order
to enable individuals to maintain their living standards after retirement. A paramount
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objective of a pension system is to achieve the sustainability (European Commission,
2010), which means the contributions could afford the expenditures in the long term.
Moreover, financial sustainability has drawn much attention recently in the current
global context of rapid ageing. Adequacy and sustainability are two sides of a coin.
If a pension system is inadequate, it will face the risk of the increases in pensions
or higher demand for other benefits in future, which will lead to the unsustainability.
Equally, if a pension system is unsustainable, it must be inadequate in the long term.
A pension system which is financially bankrupted could not afford to pay the pen-
sion benefits, not even mention to secure the decent living standards of its participants.
Thus, the recent pension reforms are striving to deliver adequate retirement incomes to
the elderly people while retaining the financial sustainability of the system at the same
time (OECD, 2015). More detailed explanations for these two principal objectives are
presented in the following.
Pension Adequacy
Adequacy has two dimensions, intrageneration adequacy and intergeneration adequacy
(Sullivan, 2004). Intragenerational adequacy requires a just distribution of resources
among the individuals in the same generation, while intergenerational adequacy relates
to the adequate distributions between the different generations.
There are also two directions in the pursuit of intragenerational adequacy, i.e. hor-
izontal adequacy and vertical adequacy (European Commission, 2015b). Horizontal
adequacy requires that individuals who have paid the same total contributions during
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their working times should receive the same pension benefits after their retirement. In
other words, people who are in the same circumstances should be treated similarly.
The vertical adequacy requires the redistribution of the income from contribution ac-
cording to each individual’s need. It means the income redistribution is operated based
on social solidarity. Since the individuals’ needs are difficult to measure, the principle
of the vertical adequacy mainly aims to prevent poverty. The horizontal and vertical
adequacies are naturally conflicting, however, both of them could be pursued gradu-
ally at the same time with the aim to build up a sustainable pension system in a broader
sense.
The concept of intergenerational adequacy has drawn much attention recently. The
topic becomes extremely hot in the context of sustainability discussion and the emerg-
ing demographic ageing problem around the world (European Commission, 2015a).
Intergenerational adequacy could be achieved if the future generations have the oppor-
tunity to live at a comparable or better standard of living as the preceding generations
(Mattil, 2006). Currently, the major concern in this area is how to adequately share
the financial burden of demographic ageing among all the generations participating in
the pension system. The evaluation in this area requires the analysis in the aspects of
demographic changes and actuarial calculations.
The measures could be taken to improve the pension adequacy is described as below:
• Increase the coverage of public pension system and enhance the development of
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voluntary occupational or private pension schemes.
• Award retroactive pension credits or reduced the impact of missing years of con-
tributions on pension benefits. As mentioned before, pension benefits are depen-
dent on the number of contribution years. Thus, the way to record the contri-
bution periods affects the level of pension benefits. This measure also helps to
increase the fairness of pension received between men and women, since women
tend to have more breaks during their contribution periods due to family affairs.
• Reduce the taxation on pensionable incomes or pension entitlements.
• Lower the management costs and improve the security of the pension system.
• Improve the security in pension fund through diversification of the investment
portfolios.
According to OECD (2015), there are a lot of countries who have already taken the
above measures to improve the pension adequacy. Japan has decreased its requirement
for contribution years. While the United Kingdom and Canada have enhanced their
complementary pension schemes by auto-enrolment and creation of new schemes re-
spectively. Increasing pension benefits to the retirees is the direct way to improve
pension adequacy. Some countries, such as Canada, France and Japan, have changed
the ways to calculate pension credits in order to increase pension benefits. While
countries including Poland, the United Kingdom, Japan and Sweden, have directly in-
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creased the adequacy by lowering the taxation on pension withdrawals or increased the
pensionable incomes by reducing the taxation on it. Efficient data collection system
and transparent information disclosure process could reduce the management costs,
and ensure the pension entitlements could be better understood and achieved by the
participants. Countries, like Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom
have already made effort on it by providing easier access to pension information. As
mentioned before, both PAYG and funded scheme have the pension fund to reserve
accumulations for future uncertainty (In a PAYG scheme, the pension fund is called
buffer fund). Thus, the security of pension fund is important to a country’s pension
system as well as the ability to provide adequate pensions. A lot of countries includ-
ing Chile and Italy have started to diversify the investment portfolio in the pension
fund. Details of the pension reforms in different countries regarding the improvement
of pension adequacy are presented in Section 2.3.
Pension Sustainability
The concept of sustainability was first introduced in the area of environmental stud-
ies. The environmental economists stated that the living generations should not em-
ploy more renewable natural resources than they can regenerate, and nonrenewable
resources should only be used if technologies allow substituting the respective natural
resources in the future (Pearce, 1992). The Brundtland Commission et al. (1987) de-
fined the sustainable development as which will not compromise the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs in current times.
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It was in the early 1990s that the concept of sustainability was applied to public finance
in the context of worldwide ageing (Holzmann et al., 2012). Sustainability regarding
the pension system can be defined in a narrow or a broad sense. In the narrow sense,
sustainability is related to the achievement of the financial equilibrium of the pension
system in the long-term. The World Bank defined a sustainable system as the one that
is financially sound and can be maintained over a foreseeable horizon under a broad
set of reasonable assumptions (Holzmann et al., 2008). European Commission defined
the fiscal sustainability as the long-term ability of the government to meet the financial
obligations linked with its current and future expenditures and debts (European Com-
mission, 2015b). No matter by which definition, the analysis requires the calculations
of total pension expenditures and total pension incomes from contributions. Some
countries, such as United States, Canada, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom,
use aggregate accounting methods to analyse the sustainability of their pension sys-
tems (Boado-Penas and Vidal-Melia´, 2012). This measure involves projections for
future demographic and economic changes and calculates the difference between the
aggregate spending for pension benefits with incomes from contributions in the long
term. The other method to measure the sustainability is based on verifiable facts, it
analyses the liabilities and assets in the current pension system regarding the current
participants and economic context. Sweden has used this method to compile their an-
nual report since 2001, and some researchers in Japan and Spain have used this method
to analyse the pension systems in their countries (Boado-Penas et al., 2008; Takayama,
2005). Detailed explanations for the methodologies to analyse the financial sustain-
abilities are included in Chapter 3.
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However, not only the financial problems in the pension system may lead to a break-
down, but also the lack of credibility of the participants and related political decisions,
which is denominated as the sustainability in a broader sense. For example, if mem-
bers of the working-age population do not believe that the current pension system
could provide their adequate pensions in the future, they will try to avoid participat-
ing in the system by leaving the labour market or creating forms of employment that
do not require participation in the pension system. Another example is, the policies
regarding the fertilities and migrations will influence the demographic structure in a
society, and this, in turn, will affect the total pension income and expenditure in a
system. Sustainability in the broader sense comprises such non-monetary aspects of
systemic stability as stated before. Furthermore, the sustainability in a narrow sense
interferes with the associated social and political sustainable factors in a broader sense.
The measures which could provide the direct improvement of the financial sustain-
ability are presented as below:
• The most common measure is to increase the statutory retirement age, because
it can lengthen the contribution periods and delay the time to claim pension
entitlements.
• Change of the indexation of pensions to give a less generous plan is another way
to decrease pension in payment. Decreasing pension benefits could directly re-
duce the pension in payment, and hence decreases the expenditures on pensions.
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• Raising contribution rates could increase the incomes from contributions.
• Reducing management and administration costs in the pension system, as stated
before in the measures to improve pension adequacy, is also helpful to achieve
financial sustainability in the long term.
According to OECD (2015), many countries have already taken the above measures in
order to achieve the financial sustainability in the long term. Almost all of the coun-
tries in OECD have scheduled to gradually increase the statutory retirement age. At
the same time, some countries have managed to reduce the pension benefit at a rea-
sonable level or decrease the indexation rules on pensions. For example, countries,
such as Finland, Greece, Belgium and the Slovak Republic have set a fixed amount for
their pension indexation. While Spain and Luxembourg have planned to link the pen-
sion indexation with future expenditures. Some countries such as Canada and France
have successfully increased the incomes from contributions by raising the contribution
rates. Details of the pension reforms in different countries in the aspect of financial
sustainability are presented in Section 2.3.
It should be noted that the measures to improve pension adequacy and financial sus-
tainability are not completely separate. Just as we have mentioned before, pension
adequacy and financial sustainability are the two sides of a coin. Actually, the im-
provement of one side is usually helpful to enhance the other side.
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2.3 Pension Reforms Around the World
The following contents in this chapter describe the global trend of pension reforms in
the context of worldwide ageing and address the necessity for the pension reforms in
China in the current situation. The reforms presented here take into account two princi-
pal objectives in the pension system, i.e. pension adequacy and financial sustainability.
Reforms regarding Pension Adequacy
According to OECD (2015) country profiles, a lot of countries have made efforts to
improve the pension adequacy. The detailed measures taken by each country are stated
as below:
In Japan, from April 2017 the required contribution years to get the national pension
will decrease from 25 to 10 years (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015).
It thus can increase the coverage and benefit more workers who have a short career.
Countries, such as Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States, who
had the long history of complementary occupational pensions and private pensions,
also made some development to broaden the coverage (Hofa¨cker et al., 2016). In the
United Kingdom, the auto-enrolment of the occupational pension has been conducted
gradually. Large employers must automatically enrol workers since October 2012 and
medium-size employers since April 2014, while small employers should comply the
enrollment from January 2016 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2014). Canada has
created new schemes to encourage participation in voluntary private pensions (Minis-
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ter of Finance, 2012).
Canada has also improved the way to record contribution periods. In Canada, past
earnings are ranked in decreasing orders and periods with lower earnings are dropped
off during the calculation of pension benefits. In 2014, the share of the dropped off
periods have increased from 16% to 17% (Government of Canada, 2015). France has
changed to a more generous plan for the pension accrual during the time of maternity
leave, professional training and unemployment (European Union, 2015). In Japan, it
will be possible for workers to pay additional voluntary contributions in order to make
up gaps during their contribution periods (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,
2015).
Poland has decreased taxation on pensions by introducing a new tax incentive on pen-
sionable incomes to encourage people to participate in the voluntary private pensions
(Chłon´-Domin´czak, 2016). In the United Kingdom, the tax on withdrawals has been
lowered and the tax-free amount for lump sum payment has been increased in 2015
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2014; European Union, 2015). In Japan, women
on maternity leave have got tax exempt from employees’ pension contributions since
April 2014 (Kitao, 2016). The basic pension income tax deduction in Sweden for peo-
ple over age 65 has been increased in 2014 (European Union, 2015; Swedish Pensions
Agency, 2015).
Australia has completed the SuperStream project who aims to establish a mandatory,
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uniform e-commerce standards to manage contributions in retirement contingency and
regulates the transfers between funds in 2016 (Ingles, 2014). France has begun to set
up the electronic account for every worker in 2016. The account will provide the infor-
mation, such as their past contributions, and projected pension benefits in both public
and mandatory occupational systems (European Commission, 2015b). New Zealand
requires the pension providers to post their information on fund performance, fees,
returns and key staff information quarterly. Furthermore, the providers also have to
offer financial education and advice to pension account holders (European Commis-
sion, 2015a). The same case is regulated in the United Kingdom, while the pension
providers must offer their members free face-to-face advice on pensions (European
Union, 2015).
Some countries have begun to improve the investment portfolios in their pension funds.
According to OECD (2016a), Chile has taken the measure to improve the safety of its
pension fund by introducing the maximum limit for foreign currency hedges, while
Italy has gone through a new rule to introduce the diversified portfolios in order to
secure the more prudent investments.
Reforms regarding Financial Sustainability
In the aspect of sustainability, as we have mentioned before, the reforms could be para-
metric reforms or structural reforms. Parametric reforms directly target the financial
balance in a pension system, thus a lot of countries have already conducted such re-
forms (European Commission, 2012).
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The statutory retirement age is the age regulated by the government at which people
can get retired and be eligible for their pension benefits (OECD, 2015). Adjustment of
retirement age is an efficient and most common method during the pension reforms,
since it affects both the contribution years that workers would contribute into the sys-
tem and the pension benefits that pensioners would receive in the future.
In Table 2.2, we can see the current statutory retirement ages in some major economies
vary a lot, from 55 years old in Indonesia to 67 years old in Iceland and Norway. The
average age is 64.7 years old for men and 63.5 years old for women around the OECD
countries. The statutory retirement age in China is relatively low in the world, which
is 60 for men, 50 for female workers and 55 for female managers. It is because the
statutory retirement age has not been changed since it has been first regulated in 1997
(Information on the pension system in China is presented in Chapter 3).
Furthermore, a lot of countries will increase the statutory retirement ages in the fu-
ture. The statutory retirement age in Italy will increase from current 66.3 years for
men and 62.3 years for women to 67 years for both genders in 2021 (Belloni and Mac-
cheroni, 2013). In Poland, the retirement age will be increased from 65 and 60 years
for men and women respectively, to 67 for both but in 2020 for men and in 2040 for
women (Go´ra, 2013). The retirement age for women in the United Kingdom will con-
verge to 65 as the same with men in 2018, while the current retirement age for women
is 62 years old. Further increases for both genders will be 66 in 2026 and 67 by 2028
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(Department for Work and Pensions, 2014). Governments in Belgium has decided to
increase the retirement age to 67 by 2030 (Struyven and Pollet, 2015). Canada will in-
crease its statutory retirement age for the basic pension to 65 and 67 between 2023 and
2029 (Minister of Finance, 2012). Retirement age in Ireland has already raised from
65 to 66 in 2014, and will further increase to 67 by 2021 and to 68 after 2028 (Gov-
ernment of Ireland, 2011). Germany will gradually increase the retirement age by one
month a year from the current level of 65.3 years, and four months for the cohort born
in 1950 to attain the target age of 67 in the future (Tao, 2017). In Hungary, the retire-
ment age will increase from 62.5 currently to 65 in the future (Jarocinska et al., 2014).
The retirement age has been raised from 65 to 66 years old in Portugal and is currently
planning to be linked with the change in life expectancy (Reis, 2015). Netherlands has
also scheduled to increase the retirement age for the basic pension to 66 by 2018 and
67 by 2021 (Sonnet et al., 2014). The retirement age will be raised in Spain from 65
in 2013 to 67 in 2027. However, full pension benefits will still be available at age 65
for those whose contribution years is equal to or above 38.5 years (De La Fuente and
Domenech, 2013). Australia made a decision to gradually increase its retirement age
in 2012, the retirement age was planned to reach 65 in 2017 and 67 in 2023. A further
increase to 70 in 2035 is currently under consideration (Podger et al., 2014). While in
France, the minimum contribution years will be increased by 1.5 years in 2035 from
the current level of 41.5 years (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2015).
Pensions in payment are adjusted during retirement to reflect changes in costs, and to
secure the decent standards of living for older people over time. The reason for this
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Table 2.2: Current statutory retirement ages for public pensions
Men Women Men Women
OECD members OECD members (cont.)
Australia 65.0 65.0 Norway 67.0 67.0
Austria 65.0 60.0 Poland 65.0 60.0
Belgium 65.0 65.0 Portugal 66.0 66.0
Canada 65.0 65.0 Slovak Republic 62.0 62.0
Chile 65.0 60.0 Slovenia 65.0 65.0
Czech Republic 62.7 61.3 Spain 65.2 65.2
Denmark 65.0 65.0 Sweden 65.0 65.0
Estonia 63.0 61.0 Switzerland 65.0 64.0
Finland 65.0 65.0 Turkey 60.0 58.0
France 61.2 61.2 United Kingdom 65.0 62.0
Germany 65.3 65.3 United States 65.0 65.0
Greece 65.0 65.0
Hungary 62.5 62.5 OECD average 64.7 63.5
Iceland 67.0 67.0
Ireland 66.0 66.0 Other major economies
Israel 67.0 62.0 Argentina 65.0 60.0
Italy 66.3 62.3 Brazil 65.0 60.0
Japan 65.0 65.0 China 60.0 50.0
Korea 65.0 65.0 India 58.0 58.0
Luxembourg 65.0 65.0 Indonesia 55.0 55.0
Mexico 65.0 65.0 Russian Federation 60.0 55.0
Netherlands 65.2 65.2 Saudi Arabia 60.0 55.0
New Zealand 65.0 65.0 South Africa 60.0 60.0
Own source based on OECD (2015) and OECD country profiles.
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adjustment is to protect older people from inflation (OECD, 2015). It also has a pow-
erful impact on the value of entitlements, thus can be also used as a method of pension
reforms to reduce the total pension expenditures.
Few countries had indexation rules when their pension systems were first established
(Sullivan, 2004). However, the high-inflation period in the 1970s led some countries
to adopt procedures for adjustment of pension in payment. Thereafter, many of them
moved from earnings related to price related indexation from the 1980s to 1990s, be-
cause wages tend to grow faster than prices (Weaver, 1998). Some countries have
set up the indexation policies, which automatically adjust the targeted indexation of
pension entitlements on an annual basis based on some indexes (OECD, 2015). Coun-
tries including Canada, Chile and Sweden adjust their pensions based on the prices
(Government of Canada, 2015; Mesa-Lago and Bertranou, 2016; Swedish Pensions
Agency, 2015). Other countries, such as Denmark, Norway and so on, change their
pension benefits according to the wages (Hagist et al., 2014). Another example is
the United Kingdom, where pensions are indexed on whatever is the highest: annual
changes in earnings, in prices, or a rate of 2.5% (Department for Work and Pensions,
2014). Pensions in Japan are indexed to wages until an individual reaches age 67 and
then to prices afterwards (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015). China does
not have any fixed indexation policy currently, but the pension in payment is adjusted
annually by the national government to keep the living standards for the current pen-
sioners.
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The recent reforms regarding the decreasing of pension benefits are stated as follows.
Spain will adjust the initial pension to new retirees based on the change in life ex-
pectancy since 2019 in every five years (Vidal-Melia, 2014). Finland has decreased its
earnings-related indexation on pensions from 1% to 0.4% in 2014 (Jarocinska et al.,
2014). Pension indexation has been frozen since 2011 in Greece and 2015 in Belgium
(European Commission, 2015a; Struyven and Pollet, 2015). Italy has set a maximum
limit to prevent the high growth of pensions, when pension goes above a threshold,
the indexation will be equal to a fixed amount (Belloni and Maccheroni, 2013). While
pension benefit has been increased by a fixed amount between 2013 to 2017 in the Slo-
vak Republic (Sika and Martisˇkova´, 2016). Furthermore, some countries have planned
to link the indexation on pensions with the financial status of the pension system. It
is also in Spain that indexation will be adjusted on an annual basis depending on the
ratio of contributions and expenditures in the pension system (European Commission,
2015a). In Luxembourg, a ‘reduction factor’ has been introduced in 2013, it regulated
that pension would only increase if the annual income from contributions exceeds ex-
penditures on pension payments (Kerschen, 2016).
The contribution rate is the ratio of pensionable earnings that current workers need
to contribute into the system during their employment in order to achieve their pension
entitlements in the future (OECD, 2015). It has an impact on the income from contri-
butions in a pension system. Thus, it is often used in a pension reform to adjust the
amount of incomes.
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Table 2.3 presents the current contribution rates in nine countries including China. The
selected countries are whose pension system is operated separately with other social
security systems, such as health insurance, disability insurance and so on. Thus, the
contributions are more linked with pension benefits in these countries. Contributions
are usually made from both employees and employers in the public pension system,
however, there are some exceptions. For example, the contributions are solely made by
employers in Australia and Iceland, and only employees contribute to their pensions
in Netherlands. Table 2.3 shows that the total contribution rates vary from 1.36% in
Denmark to 33% in Italy and the average rate is equal to 15.06% around the other eight
countries excluding China. The total contribution rate in China is 28%, and it compro-
mises of 8% from employees and 20% from employers. The contribution rate in China
is relatively higher than in other countries (Zhang, 2016), and it has been raised from
3% when the pension system has been first established in China (Please refer to Chap-
ter 3 for detailed evolution in the Chinese pension system). In the future, Canada will
increase its contribution rates from current 9.9% to 10.8% from 2017 (Government of
Canada, 2015). While in France, the contribution rate will be increased by 0.3% since
2017 for both employees and employers (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2015).
Replacement rate is the comparison between the income levels of elderly people af-
ter their retirement in relation to pre-retirement earnings (OECD, 2015). It is an ap-
propriate measurement for evaluating the ability of a pension system to maintain the
individuals’ living standards after retirement. In other words, it also shows to what ex-
tent pension systems aim to preserve the individual’s standard of living moving from
36
Table 2.3: Contribution rates for mandatory public pension system.
Employee Employer Total
Australia 9.50 9.50
Belgium 7.50 8.86 16.36
Canada 4.95 4.95 9.90
Denmark 0.54 0.82 1.36
Finland 7.05 17.75 24.80
France 6.80 8.45 15.25
Germany 9.45 9.45 18.90
Iceland 7.79 7.79
Israel 3.75 3.75 7.50
Italy 9.19 23.81 33.00
Japan 8.74 8.74 17.47
Korea 4.50 4.50 9.00
Luxembourg 8.00 8.00 16.00
Netherlands 17.90 17.90
Poland 9.76 9.76 19.52
Sweden 7.00 11.38 18.38
Switzerland 4.20 4.20 8.40
Turkey 9.00 11.00 20.00
Average 15.06
China 8.00 20.00 28.00
Own source based on OECD (2015) and OECD country profiles.
employment into retirement. It is expressed in the way that pension entitlements as
a share of individual lifetime-average earnings (Edward, 2007). The replacement rate
could be used as an indicator for the insurance role of a pension system. Some coun-
tries lower their target replacement rates in order to reduce the pension expenditures.
For example, Korea has decreased the replacement rate for the retirement contingency
from 60% to 50% in order to reduce the pension payments, and this is currently sched-
uled to decrease further to 40% by 2028 (Moon, 2009)
OECD has calculated a projected replacement rate for major economies around the
world (OECD, 2015). The calculation based on the assumption that the participant en-
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ters the system in 2014 at age 20 and retires once reaching the statutory retirement age.
The result shows that the replacement rate in China is equal to 74%, which is higher
than the average around OECD countries (52.7%). The high replacement rate in China
indicates that the amount of pension benefits is relatively high in China compared to
its individual earnings (Liao, 2016).
Furthermore, some countries, such as Sweden, Germany, and Japan, have set up an
ABM to adjust the pension parameters automatically based on some indicators that re-
flect the financial health of the pension system (Vidal-Melia´ et al., 2009, 2010; OECD,
2012).
Alternatively, as we have mentioned before, a transfer from DB to DC could shift
the risk from the government to individuals, because DC scheme provides a clear and
straightforward link between contributions and benefits. Thus, some countries have un-
dertaken some structural reforms to transfer from original PAYG DB scheme to NDC
or funded DC schemes. Countries, such as Sweden, Poland, Italy, and Latvia have
undertaken some structural reforms by changing the formula used to calculate their
initial pension from a DB to an NDC scheme (Holzmann et al., 2012; Vidal-Melia´
et al., 2010), or even to a fully funded scheme, as in the case of Chile. While Korea is
considering changing to an NDC scheme and setting up an ABM (Bonnet et al., 2010),
and India is planning to change to a funded DC system (Bali, 2014).
In China, the ageing problem is quite severe (Dorfman et al., 2013). The fertility rates
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have decreased from 6.11 in the 1950s to 1.55 in the 2010s, and it leads to a decrease
in the number of contributors financing each pensioner from 13.2 in the 1980s to a pro-
jected 1.6 in the 2080s, according to United Nations (2015). China has tried to solve
the problem by decreasing the replacement rates in urban areas from 77% to 45% in
the last decade (OECD, 2010b), and is currently considering increasing the statutory
retirement age from 50 (women) and 60 (men) to 65 in both cases (Wang, 2016; Zhang
and Guo, 2015). At the same time, China has introduced longevity insurance annuities
to maintain the living standard of elder people (Chen and Turner, 2014). Finally, Ok-
sanen (2010), Dorfman et al. (2013) and Zheng (2014) have recommended China to
consider transferring its pension scheme to NDC.
Recommendations for Future Reforms
OECD (OECD, 2015) as well as White Paper (European Commission, 2012) have
addressed the recommendations with the objective to achieve a sustainable pension
system which also delivers adequate retirement incomes in the current context. The
contents of the recommendations are listed as below:
• Link the parametric reforms with ABM, in order to respond to the context of
rapid ageing more efficiently;
• The access to early retirement and other early exit pathways should be restricted
or eliminated, because the older workers who are laid off still often enter into
early retirement programmes;
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• Support longer working periods by providing access to life-long learning, and
develop employment opportunities for older workers and supporting active and
healthy ageing;
• Support the development of supplementary pension tiers to enhance retirement
incomes. Private pension systems, who usually take the forms of funded DC,
face risks in the current context of low interest rates. Diversity the sources of
financing retirement is needed;
• Rebuilding the trust among the participants in the pension system is demand-
ing. Better information and increased transparency of the current pension system
could be delivered by providing annual pension report.
2.4 Summary
The pension system, with the objective of protecting elder people from poverty and
securing a decent life after their retirement, is necessary to a country’s social security
insurance system. Since the pension expenditures account for the government’s public
expenses, the safety of a pension system is also important to a country’s financial secu-
rity. Furthermore, with the trend of increasing globalization, each country’s financing
plan could influence the global economy as a whole. Thus, a lot of international or-
ganizations have put pension reforms on their agendas, with the aim to achieve the
adequate and sustainable pension systems in a global context (European Commission,
40
2010, 2012; OECD, 2015, 2016b).
This chapter describes the pension systems around the world as well as the case in
China, and then discuss the pension reforms in a global context. Almost every coun-
try start their initial pension systems in the form of PAYG DB, because this kind of
system can immediately start to finance the pension payments at the establishment of
the system and is easy for the redistribution of the welfare by the government. The
PAYG pension system works in the way that current active workers pay the pension
benefits to current retirees. However, the recent trend of global ageing has led to the in-
creasing imbalance between the number of working-age population and retirees, which
raises serious concerns in this system. Thus, a lot of countries has conducted some
parametric pension reforms, such as, increasing the contribution rates and retirement
ages, or decreasing the indexation on pensions and replacement rates. Some countries,
like Sweden, Poland, Italy and Latvia, have undertaken some structural reforms by
changing the formula used to calculate pension benefits from a DB to a DC scheme.
Since the contributions under a DC scheme is linked with benefits straightforward and
clearly, a transition to DC scheme could shift the risk from governments to individuals.
Furthermore, some countries (Sweden, Germany and Japan) have set up an ABM to
adjust the pension parameters based on some indicators that reflect the financial health
of the pension system. OECD and European Commissions (OECD, 2015; European
Commission, 2012) also provide some future recommendations in order to help mem-
ber and partner countries to set up a sustainable pension system which at the same
time could deliver adequate incomes for retirees. They suggest to restrict early retire-
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ment and encourage later retirement, in order to lengthen the contribution periods and
shorten the benefit claiming periods. Apart from that, they also recommend to enhance
the supplementary pension tiers, such as occupational pensions and private pensions,
in order to secure safe and decent incomes after retirement. The recommendations
also address the importance to rebuild the trust among the participants in the pension
system and link the parametric reforms with ABM.
The following chapter will focus on the pension system in China. Details on the entire
pension system in China from its establishment until its present status has been stated
in this chapter. This is the first time that the evolution of the entire public pension sys-
tem in China has been reviewed. The information in this chapter covers not only urban
areas and compulsory part but also rural areas and voluntary part. The assessment of
current challenges and future directions of pension reforms in Chinese pension system
are also presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Chinese Pension Systems – Past,
Present and Future
Chinese public pension system has undergone several reforms after its establishment
in 1951, and its evolution goes hand in hand with the economic background. There are
a lot of literature analysing the certain part of the pension system in China. However,
the review of the entire public pension system is missing. This chapter aims to fill
this gap in the previous works of literature. In general, Chinese public pension sys-
tem has undergone three stages: 1) preliminary urban and enterprise-based system in
the background of central-planned economy from 1951 to 1986; 2) developed system
with funded individual account to increase the pension portability and labour mobility
in the market competition between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enter-
prise from 1986 to 1997; 3) gradually standardized pension system starting with the
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announcement of State Council Document No. 26 in 1997 till now. Assessment of the
current challenges and future directions of pension reforms in Chinese pension system
is also provided.
3.1 Introduction
The current public pension system in China has undergone several reforms after its
first establishment in 1951. The People’s Republic of China, as one of the few pio-
neer countries who following the productive ownership as socialism, has conducted
many reforms in its pension system. The evolution of pensions goes hand in hand
with its economic background. The pension system in China has developed from the
preliminary stage at which pensions existed only in the state and urban collective sec-
tors within each enterprise to the current comprehensive system which covers urban
workers by mandatory participation and other residents both in rural and urban areas
by voluntary participation. There are a lot of literature focusing on the analysis for the
certain part of the pension system in China. However, the review of the entire pension
system is lack. With this in mind, this chapter presents the first review of the entire
public pension system in China for its whole history from the establishment to current
status together with the economic background in different periods. After that, the as-
sessment of the current challenges in the Chinese pension system is provided. Finally,
the future directions of the pension reforms in China are discussed.
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Previous studies usually focus on the pension system for employees in urban areas.
Since this part is the basis for the Chinese public pension system and has the longest
history. Holzmann et al. (2000) and Trinh et al. (2006) stated that Chinese pension
system was an urban and enterprise-based scheme until the 1980s, and it was closely
linked with the central-planned economy and featured with life-long employment at
that time. Zhao and Xu (2002) briefly reviewed the urban pension system from the
1980s to 2001, and addressed that lack of pension portability affects the competition
between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private enterprise. They found that the
funded individual accounts which were established in 1995 with the objective to in-
crease the labour mobility, was not a successful reform due to its bad implementa-
tion. Some authors (Dunaway and Arora, 2007; Piggott and Lu, 2007; Oksanen, 2010)
claimed that State Council Document No. 26 set the milestone for current pension sys-
tem by regulating the retirement ages and the requirements for benefits in the pension
system. However, West (1999) and Peng (2011) argued that the mixed management of
national account and individual account led to increasing empty amount in the funded
part. At the same time, Salditt et al. (2007) assessed the pension system from 1997
to 2006, and noted that the coverage of the pension system is very limited under 1997
regulation, as it only covered the urban employees. Dorfman et al. (2013) suggested
that China should set up an NDC scheme to cover all the workers both in urban and
rural areas.
According to Peng (2011), standardized pension system in rural areas did not exist
before 2009. Previously, the management of pensions in rural areas was very frag-
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mented and decentralized, and the system in each district was different from others.
Dorfman et al. (2013) stated that the new rural pension plan in 2009 set up a national
framework for pensions in rural areas at country’s level. It indicated that China had
made the first step to broader the pension benefit to rural areas. Since then, every rural
resident had the access to join the pension system by voluntary participation. Follow-
ing that, State Council Document No. 18 (State Council, 2011a) has announced central
government’s decision to set up the pension system for all the urban residents who are
not employed. Recently, the two voluntary participated pension systems for urban and
rural residents have been merged into one system in 2015. The current public pension
system is able to provide free access to all the residents in China.
After the review of the public pension system in China, this chapter discusses the cur-
rent challenges and the future directions of reforms in Chinese pension system. The
severe ageing problem and rapid change of demographic structure in China have led
to serious concerns in the PAYG pension system. At the same time, the fast urbaniza-
tion process and rapid expansion in higher education both put pressures to the future
pension system. Furthermore, the recent problems such as ‘empty accounts’ require
the government to rebuild the trust among participants in the pension system urgently.
Discussions of future reforms provided in this chapter take into account not only the
financial sustainability but also the pension adequacy in China.
The later contents in this chapter are organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
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evolution of the entire Chinese public pension system7 according to three different time
periods. A brief description of the economic background in China during this time is
provided as well. After that, Section 3.3 analyse the current challenges in Chinese
pension system. Then, the future directions of pension reforms in China are discussed
in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Evolution of the Pension System in China
In general, Chinese public pension system has undergone three main stages. The first
stage is the establishment of the preliminary pension system after the foundation of the
People’s Republic of China, and it is from 1951 to 1986. The second stage is from
1986 to 1997 when the preliminary system has been reformed and developed. The last
stage is from 1997 till now, the current structure of the pension system in China has
been formed and gradually standardized during this period. A brief description of the
economic background in China where the evolution of the pension systems is situated
in is provided as follows.
Economic Background in China
This section provides a brief description of the background of the Chinese economy,
in which the evolution of the pension systems is situated in. The economy after the
foundation of The People’s Republic of China can be divided into two periods, which
7Pension system in China is operated independently with other parts in the social security system.
The structure of Chinese social security system is presented in Appendix C.
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is separated by the program of economic reform termed ‘Socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics’ in December 1978 led by the reformist Deng Xiaoping.
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party installed
a planned economy in China, much like the socialist state Soviet Union (Wu, 2008).
Under this plan, the state directed and controlled a large share of the country’s eco-
nomic output, by setting production goals, controlled prices, and allocated resources
throughout most of the economy (Feltenstein and Farhadian, 1987). By 1978, the
country’s industrial production was produced by centrally controlled state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) according to centrally planned output targets. There were almost no
private enterprises or foreign-invested firms in China (McMillan and Naughton, 1992).
It was estimated that China’s real GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 5.3
percent from 1960 to 1978 (OECD, 2010a). Because the central planning economic
systems and government economic policies put little emphasis on profitability or com-
petition, the country’s economy was relatively stagnant and inefficient. As a result, the
Chinese living standards were substantially lower than those of many other developing
countries (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). Thus, the Chinese government decided to take
steps to improve economic growth and raise living standards in the late 1970s.
Economic reforms introducing market-based principles began in 1978 (Garnaut and
Song, 2004). This period started with the announcement in the ‘Third Plenary Ses-
sion of Eleventh Central Committee’ in 1978 when the reformist Deng Xiaoping in-
troduced the economic plan of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (Liu, 2009;
Wu, 2008). This plan in the late 1970s and early 1980s involved the decollectivization
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of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign investment, and permission
for entrepreneurs to start businesses. The second stage of reform, in the late 1980s and
1990s, involved the privatization and contracting out of much state-owned industry and
the lifting of price controls, protectionist policies. The private sector grew remarkably,
accounting for as much as 70 percent of China’s gross domestic product by 2005 (Wu,
2008). As a part of the decentralization of economic policymaking, provincial and
local governments took economic control of various enterprises, allowing them to op-
erate and compete on free market principles. Between the start of an economic reform
program in 1978 and 2000, the GDP growth was 9.8 percent a year (OECD, 2010a). In
1999 China became the second largest economy in the world, after the United States.
The following contents provide a review for the evolution of Chinese pension systems
in detail.
3.2.1 Establishment of the Preliminary System (1951–1986)
Soon after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, in order to meet
the goal of restoring the national economy and stabilize the national order, the first
pension system was introduced in 1951 and regulated under the National Labour In-
surance Regulation. It existed only in the state and urban collective sectors8 and was a
pure PAYG system within each enterprise (Holzmann et al., 2000; Trinh et al., 2006).
8Collective sectors are enterprises whose ownership belongs to the socialist working population. The
enterprise operated as the collective sectors is managed by all the workers in it, and all the workers are
responsible for the profit and loss in their enterprise.
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At that time, the pension benefit varied from 50% to 70% of the employees’ salaries,
depending on the number of employed years. The contributions were entirely from the
employers, and the contribution rate was 3% of the total salary bills (Cai and Cheng,
2014).
The pension system in China in its preliminary stage was gradually established in the
context of the planned economic system (Holzmann et al., 2000). It was the necessary
step for the development of the economics at that time. In general, the pension system
in this period had the following characteristics:
1. The state and enterprise were in charge of the operation for the pension sys-
tem together, and enterprise had the primary responsibility. Under this pension
system, the state and the enterprise both shared the financial burden to pay the
pension benefits. After 1967, the enterprise took the main responsibility to fi-
nance the system. The welfare of the participants in the pension system during
this period was closely linked with the productive ability in each enterprise.
2. Since the management of the pension system was within each enterprise, the
welfare of the pensioners was dependent on the profits earned by each enter-
prise. It thus led to the significant differences in the benefits among pensioners
in different enterprises. Furthermore, it was very hard to set up the same standard
for the participants in different enterprises. As a result, it caused the most seri-
ous problem, which was lack of labour mobility in the market, i.e. workers were
restricted to stay and work for the same employer under this system, otherwise
50
they would lose their all pension benefits in the future.
3. The financing plan for the pension system during this period was purely PAYG.
There was no funded plan under this system. In addition, because the amount of
income from contributions was very small at that time, it was very hard for the
pension system to reserve any fund during this period.
4. The coverage of the pension was very narrow in this period. Only the pension
system for urban workers in collective sectors existed during this time. There
was no pension plan for the rural population at that time.
3.2.2 Development of the New System (1986–1997)
Zhao and Xu (2002) described that pension reforms in China went hand in hand with
economic reforms. Since the beginning of Chinese economic reforms in the early
1980s, the Chinese urban pension system has undergone a series of reforms.
The 1980s economic reforms encouraged competition in the market between private
enterprises and SOEs. Labour mobility was the prerequisite condition for this market
competition. However, the previous pension system restricted labour mobility in the
market, because changing employment meant a change in pension pools and loss of
all the previously accumulated pension benefits from the previous employer (Oksa-
nen, 2010; Zhao and Xu, 2002). The pension system, thus, became a major stumbling
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block on the road to economic reforms. The main characteristics of pension reforms
during this period is that new pension system replaced the old one which only exists in
each enterprise, the local governments (cities or counties) took the management of the
pension system. The funded individual accounts were established. The new system
consists of two parts. The first part is the national account, and the contribution to
which is from employers. The second part is the individual account, and the contribu-
tion to which is mainly from employees. The following contents present the details of
the evolution for the pension system during this period.
The central government’s ‘7th five-year plan’ in 1986 stipulated that both the employ-
ees and the employers need to contribute to the pension system in order to set up the
social security covering the whole society. From that time, the financial burden in the
pension system has been shared among central government, enterprise and individu-
als contributions together. It implies the beginning of the new pension system in China.
Funded individual accounts were established in 1995 (State Council, 1995) in order
to increase the portability of pensions for redundant workers who left SOEs during the
economic reforms in the mid-1980s and to increase the labour mobility as well. The
contribution to individual accounts was mainly from employees. The accumulation
and the interests generated in this account would be paid as the pension benefit to the
employees when they retired. However, the system did not work in the way it was
intended. Because of large-scale SOE restructuring, many laid-off workers were given
immediate pensions at quite young ages (even at 40). This led to deficits in the social
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pools of PAYG type (Zhao and Xu, 2002). As a result, local governments used the
funds in individual accounts to pay for the pensions of current retirees in the PAYG
part, which largely emptied the individual accounts (West, 1999; Peng, 2011). The
‘empty accounts’ problem has emerged since then.
Because the national pension system at this stage was not unified and the management
was highly decentralized. A lot of problems emerged:
1. Since the individual account was managed by the local government, usually on
the levels of cities or counties, it thus in practice made the portability of the indi-
vidual account to be very difficult. Furthermore, it affected the labour mobility
in the market.
2. The levels of pension benefit between various districts were very different. The
replacement rates in some districts were as high as 105-110%, which led to the
huge financial burden to the government. In overall, the average benefit level
around the country was relatively high. The average replacement rate was around
86% in China, which was higher than the developed countries by 20-30% at that
time (Oksanen, 2010).
3. Since the management of the pension fund belonged to local governments, the
ability to disperse the risk was very low. It was very hard for local government
to ensure the welfare of the retirees depending on the small social pool of cities
or counties.
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4. The coverage of the pension system was very narrow. The pension systems in
some places only covered the workers in SOEs.
3.2.3 Standardization of the System (1997–present)
In order to solve the problems stated above, the central government has published the
State Council Document No. 26 to set up the standards for the pension system in the
country. State Council Document No. 26 (State Council, 1997) set the milestone of
the current Chinese pension system in 1997 (Dunaway and Arora, 2007; Piggott and
Lu, 2007; Oksanen, 2010). It was stipulated that the normal retirement age in China
for men is 60 and that for women is 50. The document regulated that the mandatory
pension system in China consists of two parts (Salditt et al., 2008). The first part fol-
lows a PAYG DB scheme: Employers contribute 20% of the employees’ salaries into
the social pool managed by local governments, and employees have to contribute for
at least 15 years to receive the pension. The second part follows a funded DC scheme:
Employers together with the employees contribute 11% of the employees’ salaries into
individual accounts; the proportion of employees’ contribution varies from 4% to 8%,
and the remaining contribution is from the employers (Cai and Cheng, 2014). After
the 1997 pension reform, pension pools spread to provinces, and all urban workers
were expected to participate regardless of ownership (Zhao and Xu, 2002). Although
the fund in the individual account was originally designed to be exclusive from the
national account, because there had been no regulation regarding the separate man-
agement for the two accounts, the ‘empty accounts’ problem became more and more
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severe (West, 1999; Peng, 2011). Thus, to solve this problem, the central government
published ‘Notice on the Pilot Scheme for Urban Social Security System’ in 2000 to
regulate the separation between national account and individual account. The central
government also announced the decision to gradually fulfil the funded individual ac-
count since that time (Salditt et al., 2007).
In 2005, State Council Document No. 38 (State Council, 2005) changed the contri-
bution rate of individual accounts to 8%, and contributions to this part were stipulated
to be solely from employees.
Thus, the current Chinese compulsory pension system for urban workers, named urban
enterprise pension system (UEPS), has been formed. It consists of two parts. The first
part is a PAYG DB type national account with a contribution rate of 20% paid by the
employer. The second part is a fully funded DC type individual account to which indi-
viduals contribute 8% of their salaries. The fund associated with each account operates
separately.
From 2003, some local governments have tried to set up a social security system for
the rural old-age population. However, the pension system for the rural population at
that time was on a very preliminary stage (Peng, 2011). First, there was no standard-
ized system in the rural areas, the system in each district was different from others.
Second, because the level of subsidies from local government as well as the income
from the rural population was very low, the benefit for the pensioners was very low.
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Third, it was very hard for the system to disperse risk in the whole society, because
of the decentralization of the management. Fourth, there was no standard rule for the
management of the pension fund, thus almost no interest had been generated in the
fund.
The standardized pension system in rural areas has been set up by the central gov-
ernment in 2009 (State Council, 2009). The new pension system is financed by the
combination of individual contributions, local government subsidies and central gov-
ernment subsidies, other than the individual’s saving alone in previous time (Dorfman
et al., 2013). The pension benefit is from two accounts, the national account and in-
dividual account. Participants are free to choose from five levels from 100RMB to
500RMB (per year) to contribute into their individual accounts. The local government
has to contribute at least 30RMB annually to each individual’s account as well. The
participants are entitled to the pension benefit, if they reach the age of 60 and have
contributed at least 15 years into the system. The pension from the national account
is equal to 55RMB each year and is solely from central government’s subsidy. The
pension from the individual account is dependent on the amount of accumulation and
its returns. All the rural residents who are above age 16 and has not participated in the
UEPS are voluntary to join the rural citizens pension system (RCPS).
In 2011, the central government has announced the State Council Document No.18
(State Council, 2011b) to set up the pension system for all the urban citizens who are
not in employment. The urban citizens pension system (UCPS) has been established,
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and all the urban citizens who are above age 16 and has not participated in the UEPS
is voluntary to join this system. The structure of this pension scheme is similar to
rural citizens. Contributions under this system are still combined with individual con-
tributions, local government subsidies and central government subsidies. The pension
benefit is also from two accounts, the national account and individual account. How-
ever, the citizens in urban areas could choose higher contribution levels than those in
rural areas. Participants are free to choose from ten levels from 100RMB to 1000RMB
(per year) to contribute into their individual accounts. Then, the same as rural citizens,
The local government’s subsidy is equal to at least 30RMB each year. The participants
can start to get pension benefit when they reach the age of 60 and have contributed at
least 15 years into the system. The pension from the national account is financed by
central government’s subsidy and is equal to 55RMB each year. The pension from the
individual account is dependent on its accumulations and returns.
The summarised information for various public pension schemes in China is presented
in Tabel 3.1.
According to the State Council Document No.8 (State Council, 2014), the voluntary
pension systems for urban and rural citizens have been unified together since 2015. In
addition, the central government’s subsidy for the national account has been raised to
70RMB each year since then. The participants are able to choose from twelve levels
from 100RMB to 2000RMB (per year) to contribute into their individual accounts. The
diagram showing the structure of the Chinese public pension system after 2015 based
on its participation types is presented in Figure 3.1.
57
Ta
bl
e
3.
1:
B
as
ic
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fo
rt
he
pu
bl
ic
pe
ns
io
n
sy
st
em
in
C
hi
na
U
rb
an
E
nt
er
pr
is
e
Pe
ns
io
n
Sy
st
em
(U
E
PS
)
U
rb
an
C
iti
ze
ns
Pe
ns
io
n
Sy
st
em
(U
C
PS
)
R
ur
al
C
iti
ze
ns
Pe
ns
io
n
Sy
st
em
(R
C
PS
)
D
at
e
of
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t
19
51
cu
rr
en
ts
ch
em
e
st
ar
ts
fr
om
19
97
20
11
20
09
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
A
ll
ur
ba
n
w
or
ke
rs
U
rb
an
un
em
pl
oy
ed
ci
tiz
en
s
ag
ed
ab
ov
e
16
R
ur
al
ci
tiz
en
s
ag
ed
ab
ov
e
16
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
N
at
io
na
la
cc
ou
nt
:
20
%
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
sa
la
ri
es
.
T
he
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n
is
fr
om
em
pl
oy
er
s.
In
di
vi
du
al
ac
co
un
t:
8%
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
sa
la
ri
es
.
T
he
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n
is
fr
om
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
In
di
vi
du
al
s
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
ns
on
va
ri
ou
s
le
ve
ls
+
lo
ca
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
su
bs
id
y.
B
ot
h
go
in
to
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
ac
co
un
t.
T
he
sa
m
e
as
U
C
PS
.B
ut
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
’s
co
nt
ri
bu
tio
n
le
ve
li
s
di
ff
er
en
t.
Pe
ns
io
n
be
ne
fit
N
at
io
na
la
cc
ou
nt
:
T
he
am
ou
nt
de
pe
nd
s
on
th
e
av
er
ag
e
sa
la
ry
an
d
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fc
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
ye
ar
s.
In
di
vi
du
al
ac
co
un
t:
T
he
am
ou
nt
de
pe
nd
s
on
th
e
ac
cu
m
ul
at
io
ns
an
d
th
e
in
te
re
st
s
in
th
e
ac
co
un
t.
N
at
io
na
la
cc
ou
nt
so
le
ly
fin
an
ce
d
by
ce
nt
ra
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t+
In
di
vi
du
al
A
cc
ou
nt
T
he
sa
m
e
as
U
C
PS
.
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
ty
pe
C
om
pu
ls
or
y
C
om
pu
ls
or
y
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y
O
w
n
so
ur
ce
ba
se
d
on
St
at
e
C
ou
nc
il’
s
do
cu
m
en
ts
.
58
Figure 3.1: Structure of Chinese public pension system based on participation type,
2015–present.
Own source
This thesis focus on the analysis of PAYG pension system in the compulsory part of
urban workers, i.e. the national account in UEPS. It is not only because this system
accounts for the largest part of the compulsory pension system, but also because the
original problem of the whole compulsory pension system exists in this part. Detailed
information on this PAYG pension scheme is stated below.
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PAYG National Account
Contributions. The policy on contributions to this compulsory PAYG scheme has
not been changed since 1997. As mentioned before, the contribution is solely from
employers, and the contribution rate is equal to 20% of the total salary bills. The
contribution goes into the national account, the fund of which is independent of the
individual account.
Requirement to collect benefit. The statutory retirement age is 60 for male work-
ers, 55 for female managers, and 50 for other female workers. Many workers, how-
ever, are able to collect benefits before the statutory retirement age according to special
provisions of the system. Retirement age is reduced for those working in hazardous
occupations or who are seriously ill or disabled because of work. For those who have
worked in hazardous occupation for the certain number of years and contributed to
social security program for at least 15 years, social security receipt age for males and
females are 55 and 45. For those being seriously ill or disabled, males can apply for
social security benefits at age 50 and females can do this at age 45, on the condition
that they have contributed for at least 15 years. Summarised information on the re-
quirements to collect pension benefits in various conditions is presented in Table 3.2.
Benefit formulae. The formula to calculate the initial retirement pension of the Chi-
nese PAYG DB national account, Pt, is expressed as follows:
Pt =
1 +WI
2
· Yt−1 · A · 1%, (3.1)
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where A is the number of contribution years, Yt−1 is the average salary for all con-
tributors in the system at time t − 1, and WI is the wage index for each individual.
WI is an indicator used to measure the relative weight of each individual contribution
base with respect to the average contribution base of the total working population. The
formula to calculate WI is as follows:
WI =
A∑
k=1
yt−k
Yt−k · A, (3.2)
where yt−k is the salary at time t− k for individuals who retire at time t.
3.3 Current Challenges in Chinese Pension System
The problems of longevity and lower fertility have emerged at the global level. How-
ever, the severity in China outpaced the world average level.
According to United Nations (2015), the life expectancy at birth in China was 43.39
in the 1950s, however, it has been increasing rapidly to 75.43 in the 2010s. While
the world average level has only increased from 46.81 to 70.47 during the same pe-
riod. Furthermore, the life expectancy at birth in China has exceeded world average
level since 1965 and kept increasing recently, as shown in Figure 3.2. Increase of the
longevity is a good thing, as people are living longer than before. Because of the rapid
economic growth in China, both the living standards and the medical treatment ac-
cess has been improved rapidly, which help people to get longer lives (Dorfman et al.,
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2013). However, the longevity will increase the pension payment periods which in turn
affect the financial sustainability of the pension system.
At the same time, the total fertility rates in China dropped from 6.11 (children per
woman) to 1.55 during the same period. While the world average level only decreased
from 4.96 to 2.51 during this time. The current fertility rate in China is below 2, which
means the total number of population is diminishing because a pair of the parent cannot
reproduce at least two babies. The rapid decreasing of total fertility rates was mainly
due to the one-child policy which had been introduced in 1979. Figure 3.3 depicts the
evolution of total fertility rates in China and in world average level, together with the
relevant events indicated. The one-child once introduced has dropped the fertility rate
in China down above the world average level. And this policy kept decreasing the total
fertility rate in China thereafter. Rapid decreases in the fertility rates will lead to the
reduction of the working-age population, hence decrease the income from contribu-
tions in the pension system.
Increasing longevity and decreasing fertility have led to an increasing old-age depen-
dency ratio and a rapidly ageing society in China. As shown in Figure 3.4, the old-age
dependency ratio (aged 65+/aged 15-64) in China was increasing more rapidly from
7.3% in 1950 to 13% in 2015 than the world average level from 8.4% to 12.6% during
the same period. Recently, this ratio in China has become higher than the world aver-
age in 2015.
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Furthermore, based on the population data provided by United Nations (2015), the
elderly population (aged 60+) in China is equal to 201 million in 2015, which is now
more than the entire population of Japan and the United Kingdom equal to 127 mil-
lion and 65 million respectively. With higher life expectancy and lower fertility, the
population in China is severely ageing both in absolute terms as measured by the total
number of elderly population and in relative terms as measured by the proportion of
elderly compared to the working-age population (old-age dependency ratio).
Figure 3.2: Life expectancy at birth for China and World
Own source based on United Nations (2015)
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Figure 3.3: Total fertility rates for China and World
Own source based on United Nations (2015)
Figure 3.4: Old-age dependency ratio (aged 65+/aged 15-64) for China and World
Own source based on United Nations (2015)
The challenges in Chinese pension system has not stopped so far. The increased living
standards and spread access to healthcare will continue to push life expectancy to a
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new higher level in China.
At the same time, China’s college education annual enrollment has been tripled, from
2.2 million to 6.6 million in the last decade (Cai and Cheng, 2014). As a result of
the expansion in higher education, the size of the young labour force will decline, and
Howden and Zhou (2014) found that the working population in China had started to
decline in 2012. On the condition of no pension reform on the retirement age, the later
people enter the labour market will lead to shorter contribution period. Thus, it will
reduce the total amount of income from contributions. Finally, the financial imbalance
between the incomes and expenditures will happen, and cause serious problems to a
PAYG pension system.
The pending problem of ‘empty accounts’ makes participants lose confidence in the
transparency of the current pension system. According to Zheng (2016), the accrued
amount in individual accounts is equal to 4097 billion RMB until the end of 2014,
while the accumulated fund in UEPS is only 3180 billion RMB. Since the participants
cannot perceive their future benefit in the current pension system, they will try to leave
the labour market or create some forms of employment which can avoid participation
in the pension system. As the origin of the ‘empty accounts’ comes from the financial
deficits in national account, the only way to solve this problem and regain the credi-
bility among the participants is to construct a sustainable pension system in the PAYG
system.
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Furthermore, the recent trend of urbanization has transited a large amount of working-
age population from rural to urban areas. The huge inflow of the young population
might facilitate the current economic development in urban areas, however, it will lead
to the heavy financial burden to the urban pension system in the future.
In overall, analysis of the pension system in China and implementation of the pension
reforms to restore the sustainability of Chinese pension system are demographically
urgent, economically necessary and socially and politically essential.
3.4 Future Directions of Pension Reforms in China
The future directions of the pension reforms in China should be based on two principle
objectives – adequacy and sustainability. With these objectives in mind, the following
contents discuss the future directions of pension reforms in China.
Future Reforms regarding Pension Adequacy
As mentioned before, in order to achieve the pension adequacy, the first step is to en-
sure every individual could get access to the pensions. However, currently in China,
the UEPS has not covered all the urban employed workers yet. In order to avoid pay-
ing higher contributions into the pension system (As mentioned before, the employers
need to pay 20% of employees’ salary bills into the system), some private enterprises
tends to pay a higher salary for their employees as a negotiation for their compromises
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to be not enrolled in the pensions (Pozen, 2013; Dorfman et al., 2013). On the other
side, it is often very difficult to record the pension credits for people who take short-
term careers or part-time jobs. And, this is not only the problem in China but also
the problem around the world. According to OECD (2015), only about three out of
ten older people have received some support from public pensions on average across
OECD countries. The Chinese government is trying to cover all the urban workers into
the UEPS, and the growth number of new participants keeps increasing recently at an
average rate of 7.31% from 2007 to 2015 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Future reforms should also focus
on broadening the coverage to supply pensions to every urban worker. Furthermore,
Dorfman et al. (2013) suggested that the pension system in the future should cover all
the workers regardless of the region.
The current regulation for people to collect pension entitlements requires at least 15
years contribution into the pension system. The requirement for the contribution peri-
ods could be shortened in the future in order to spread pensions to more people. For
example, Japan has planned to decrease its required contribution years to get the na-
tional pension from 25 to 10 years from April 2017 (Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare, 2015). On the other side, currently only disabled worker whose age is below
50 for men and 45 for women is eligible to pay additional voluntary payment to make
up their contribution gaps for pension benefits (see Table 3.2). The coverage of this
additional payment could be spread to every worker in the future, in order to help more
people get the adequate pension after their retirement.
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In 2015, the Chinese central government has decided to merge UCPS and RCPS into
one system called urban and rural citizens pension system (detailed information is
presented in Section 3.2). It implies that the government is trying to reduce the man-
agement and administration costs by unifying the pension systems. It also helps to
reduce costs to set the standard rules in the unified pension system. The future direc-
tion of reforms in this aspect could focus on enhancing the voluntary complementary
pension schemes. On the other side, the Chinese government has decided to set up an
electronic pension data management system called ‘Golden Insurance Project’ in 2010
at the national level. However, the implementation is still in process as it requires a
lot of human and financial resources. In the future, the government could also provide
pension education and advice to individuals through this project.
The Chinese government also tried to diversify its investment portfolios on pension
fund. It has been approved that up to 30% of the pension fund could be invested in
the domestic stock market since August 17th, 2015. While previously, the pension
fund was only allowed to be invested in the bank deposits and treasury bonds with a
very low yield. Future directions could develop the portfolio to include more kinds of
investments, such as foreign currencies and foreign stocks.
Future Reforms regarding Financial Sustainability
The paramount objective of a pension system is to achieve the financial sustainability.
It is impossible for a bankrupted system to provide adequate pensions to its partic-
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ipants. A system which is not sustainable in the long term cannot even fulfill the
promises to pay benefits, not ever mentioned to obtain the pension adequacy. Thus, to
ensure the financial sustainability is the most important thing in a pension system.
As we have mentioned before, the most common measure to improve the financial
sustainability is to increase the retirement age. Thus, the current popular recommen-
dation on the pension reform in China is to increase the statutory retirement age for
both genders to 65 years old. Cai and Zhang (2015) and Zheng (2011) mentioned that
the current statutory retirement age in China has not been changed since the establish-
ment of the pension system. The current statutory retirement age is 60 for male, 55 for
female managers and 50 for female workers, which is much lower than the majority of
the countries. The retirement age in most of the countries around the world is equal to
65 years old (see Table 2.2). The retirement age in these countries has been continuing
to be adjusted with the increase of the life expectancies. Thus, the reform in China
is urgent. This recommendation has been formally proposed to the State Council in
the 2015 annual sessions of NPC & CPPCC (The National People’s Congress of the
People’s Republic of China & The National Committee of The Chinese People’s Polit-
ical Consultative Conference), and it is currently under the consideration of the State
Council.
The other measures regarding parametric reforms such as decreasing indexation on
pensions or increasing contribution rates could also be taken during the future pen-
sion reforms. As mentioned before, China has not had any fixed indexation policy on
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pensions now. At the same time, the current contribution rate for the PAYG national
account in China has not been changed since 1997. However, in the current context of
severe ageing and rapid change in demographic structures, providing the review of the
pension system and taking corresponding pension reforms on a regular basis is neces-
sary for China. By reviewing the current trend around the world (Detailed information
on the pension reforms around the world is presented in Section 2.3.), the advancement
of future parametric reforms could be obtained through directly linking the parameters
with financial sustainability. Furthermore, ABM should be introduced in China in or-
der to secure the long-term sustainability of the pension system in a more effect and
efficient way.
Another suggestion on the future pension reforms focuses on the change of current
pension structures. Considering that the ‘empty accounts’ in the individual accounts
is difficult to be refilled, and the DC schemes could better link contributions with ben-
efits. Oksanen (2010), Dorfman et al. (2013) and Zheng (2014) recommend China to
change its current UEPS (PAYG DB + Funded DC) to NDC scheme. The structure of
the new NDC scheme is presented in Figure A.1. The current national account which
following the PAYG DB scheme is proposed to be changed in an NDC account. A
further modification is recommended on the calculation of pension benefits. In the
previous DB account, both regional average wage and individuals wage are taken into
account, while the new proposal in social pooling account only considers regional av-
erage wage. As mentioned before, the current individual account is originally designed
and supposed to be a funded DC scheme, however, the problem of ‘empty accounts’
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make it be a partially funded DC scheme in practice. Currently, the government is
making efforts to fulfill the individual accounts by the government revenues. The new
scheme in the proposal replaces the current individual accounts by a wage-based NDC
scheme.
Figure 3.5: Current and proposed structural reforms in China
Own source based on Dorfman et al. (2013)
Other reforms, which have been raised by OECD for its member and partner countries
in order to achieve the sustainable and adequate pension systems (see Section 2.3),
should also be considered during the future pension reforms in China. The following
analysis in this thesis is also helpful to the implementation of these recommendations.
For example, Chapter 4 provides the actuarial reports for the pension system which
aims to increase the transparency and rebuild the trust among the participants. After
that, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 set up the ABM for China under different fertility and
migration policies, it helps people to better understand how the different policies could
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affect the sustainability in the context of ageing. Furthermore, the establishment of the
ABM could help the pension system to response the rapid changes of low fertilities
and rapid urbanization more efficiently.
3.5 Summary
This chapter first reviews the entire public pension system in China from its establish-
ment to current status by dividing the evolution into three stages. The first stage is
from 1951 to 1986, as the preliminary pension system was first established in 1951.
It was an urban and enterprise-based system featured with life-long employment of
the central-planned economic system. In the 1980s, the economic reforms in China
encouraged the competition between SOEs and private enterprises. Thus, the second
stage of pension system reform in China from 1986 to 1997 aimed to increase the pen-
sion portability and labour mobility in the market. A funded individual account was
introduced in 1995 with this purpose. After that, State Council Document No. 26
State Council (1997) set the milestone of the current Chinese pension system in 1997.
It implied the beginning of the third stage when the system was gradually reformed
with standardization till now. The current public pension system in China consists of
two parts, that is the compulsory UEPS covering urban employees and the voluntary
Urban and Rural Citizens Pension System covering all the other citizens who have not
participated in UEPS.
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This chapter also assesses the current challenges in the Chinese pension system. Age-
ing problems in China present more severe situation than the world average level. Since
the situation will lengthen the pension payment periods and reduce the income from
contributions at the same time, it thus will affect the financial sustainability of the
PAYG pension system. The pressures brought about by the other changes in Chinese
society, such as expansion in higher education and rapid process of urbanization, are
also addressed in this chapter. Apart from that, rebuilding the trust of participants in
the pension system is urgent as well.
Discussions on future directions of pension reforms for China in this chapter take
into account not only financial sustainability but also pension adequacy. Reforms to
improve the pension adequacy in China includes: increasing the coverage of UEPS;
lowering the required contribution years for pensions in order to provide more peo-
ple with pension entitlements; developing the pension information system and provide
free education and advice on pensions; and diversifying the investment portfolios in
pension fund to include more choices, such as, foreign currencies and stocks. Future
pension reforms directly target at the financial sustainability in China are: increasing
statutory retirement age for both genders to 65 years old; setting up an ABM to link
the parametric reforms with the financial status of the pension system directly; and
transferring the current UEPS system to NDC schemes.
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Chapter 4
Sustainability Indicators
This chapter analyses the Chinese contributory PAYG pension system in the urban
area over the period 2007-2012 using two actuarial balance methodologies. First, we
use the Swedish solvency ratio (SR) to analyse the solvency of the Chinese pension
system based on verifiable facts. Second, the United States’ actuarial balance indicator
(AB), that takes into account the projected demographic and economic scenario is
calculated. This is the first estimate of solvency/sustainability levels of the Chinese
PAYG pension system. Both methodologies show that the Chinese pension system in
its current form is neither sustainable nor solvent. The chapter also provides some
advice on the parametric reforms that should be undertaken to restore the financial
health of the system.
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4.1 Introduction
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems require a balance between the benefits paid to
pensioners and the contributions made by active workers. The decline in fertility rates
and the increase in longevity will contribute to a substantial increase in the old-age
dependency ratio, and this will raise serious concerns for the sustainability of PAYG
pension systems. This is a worldwide problem, and many European countries have
already carried out some parametric reforms9, such as, an increase of the retirement
age or a decrease of the indexation on pensions to reduce the expenditure on pensions.
Countries, such as Sweden, Poland, Italy and Latvia have undertaken some structural
reforms by changing the formula to calculate their initial pension from a defined benefit
(DB) to a notional defined contribution (NDC) pension scheme (Holzmann et al., 2012;
Vidal-Melia´ et al., 2010), or even to a fully funded scheme like the Chilean case.
In the meantime, some countries, such as Sweden, Germany and Japan, have decided
to set up an automatic balance mechanism (ABM) according to an indicator10 that
reflects the financial health of the system.
In Asia11, the situation presents a greater challenge. The speed of ageing in Asia is
much faster than it is in Europe. According to United Nations (2015), the old-age
dependency ratio for Europe is forecast to increase from 24% in the early 2010s to
9Pension reforms in European countries can be found in Boeri et al. (2013), OECD (2015) and
Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006).
10See Vidal-Melia´ et al. (2009, 2010) and OECD (2012) for more details on ABM.
11Pension reforms in Asian countries can be found in Hujo and Cook (2012).
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50% by the 2080s, while in Asia it will increase from 10% to 42% during the same
period. Japan, which has one of the most severe ageing problems, has taken several
measures, including increasing the retirement age from 60 to 65 and setting up an ABM
(called the modified indexation12) that is applied to both the revaluation of contribution
bases and pensions in payment, taking into account improvements in life expectancy
and population decreases. According to Moon (2009), South Korea has decreased the
replacement rate for the retirement contingency from 60% to 50% and is currently
scheduled to fall further to 40% by 2028. Also, they are considering transferring to an
NDC scheme and setting up an ABM (Bonnet et al., 2010). At the same time, Vietnam
is considering to transfer from PAYG DB to partially funded defined contribution (DC)
(Giang, 2013). Pension systems in countries such as Thailand and India, that are not
widely covered in the national scale, have conducted many reforms and recently they
both plan to transfer to a funded DC system13.
In some former British colonies, such as Singapore or Malaysia, the central provident
fund (CPF) is a compulsory comprehensive savings plan designed to fund mainly re-
tirement and healthcare. The CPF was not a good solution given early withdrawals.
In Singapore, the retirement age has been increased from 55 in 1993 to 62 recently
and is proposed to raise to 67 in the future while the contribution rate has increased by
1.5% as stated in Asher and Bali (2015) and Asher and Rajan (2002). Malaysia has
increased the contribution rate from an initial 10% to 23% and also set restrictions on
early withdraws (Asher and Bali, 2012; Tolos et al., 2014).
12See Sakamoto (2005) for more details.
13See Brustad (2012) and Holzmann et al. (2000) for details on Thailand and Bali (2014) for details
on India.
77
In China14, the problem is made worse by the one-child policy which was implemented
in the 1980s, and has only recently been relaxed. The policy led to a sharp decline in
fertility rates from 6.11 in the 1950s to 1.55 in the 2010s, and as a result, a decrease
in the number of contributors financing each pensioner from 13.2 in the 1980s to a
projected 1.6 in the 2080s according to United Nations (2015). China has tried to solve
the problem by decreasing the replacement rates in urban areas from 77% to 45% in
the last decade (OECD, 2010b) and is currently considering to increase the statutory
retirement age from 50 of women and 60 of men to 65 for both sexes. At the same time,
China has introduced longevity insurance annuities to maintain the living standard of
elder people (Chen and Turner, 2014). Finally, as stated by Oksanen (2010), Dorfman
et al. (2013) and Zheng (2014), China is also considering to transfer its pension scheme
to NDC.
This chapter analyses the long-term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension sys-
tem in urban areas using two actuarial models–The Swedish solvency ratio (SR) based
on the verifiable facts and the United States’ actuarial balance indicator (AB) which
takes into account the projected demographic and economic structures in the next 75
years.
Following this introduction, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 4.2 introduces the methodologies to calculate the Swedish solvency ratio and the
United States’ actuarial balance indicator. Section 4.3 analyses the Chinese pension
system following the Swedish methodology. This section also includes a description
14Information on pension reforms in China can be found in Dorfman et al. (2013)
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of the data and main assumptions, together with a comparison with Swedish pension
system and some advice on the parametric reforms. Section 4.4 analyses the Chinese
pension system using the United States’ methodology. This section also contains a de-
scription of the data and main assumptions, together with a comparison with the United
States’ pension system and a discussion of possible parametric reforms. Section 4.5
provides the summary of this chapter.
4.2 Methodologies
This section describes the methodologies used to calculate the Swedish solvency ratio
(SR) and the United States’ actuarial balance indicator (AB). These are two different
methodologies to analyse the long-term sustainability of the pension system.
The Swedish model is based on the verifiable facts. It analyses the assets and liabilities
accrued for the current contributors and pensioners in the pension system. The future
changes in the demographic and economic structures do not affect the analysis in this
methodology. The Swedish model requires the government to compile an actuarial
balance sheet for the pension system on an annual basis. The methodology to calculate
the Swedish SR is provided in Section 4.2.1.
On the other hand, the United States’ model makes projections on the demographic
and economic structures over the next 75 years. It analyses the differences between
the present values of the pension expenditures and the contributions. The AB indicates
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how much the current contribution rate should increase for the system to be sustainable
over the next 75 years. The methodology to calculate the United States’ AB is provided
in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 The Swedish Solvency Ratio (SR)
The actuarial balance sheet has been developed and applied by Sweden on an annual
basis since 2001. It is an actuarial balance sheet in the accounting sense of the term
and can be defined as the financial statement listing a pension system’s obligations
towards contributors and pensioners together with the amount of assets that back up
those liabilities15. The main aim of the actuarial balance sheet is to give a true and fair
view of the pension system’s solvency, by comparing the assets and liabilities every
year. Compiling the actuarial balance sheet gives transparency into the pension system
at the same time it increases the confidence of contributors and pensioners.
On an official level, the actuarial balance sheet has not been used outside Sweden,
although in the cases of Japan and Spain an actuarial balance sheet has been used by
researchers16.
The structure of the actuarial balance sheet is shown in Table 4.1:
15Detailed information can be seen in Boado-Penas et al. (2008), Boado-Penas and Vidal-Melia´
(2012) and Swedish Pensions Agency (2013).
16See Boado-Penas et al. (2008) for Spain and Takayama (2005) for Japan.
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Table 4.1: Main entries on the actuarial balance sheet of a pay-as-you-go pension
system
Assets Liabilities
Financial assets Liability to pensioners
Total assets Total liabilities
The system is solvent17 (or sustainable) as long as: (Financial assets + Contribution
assets) > (Liability to pensioners + Liability to contributors). This implies that the
accumulated deficit must be nil or negative or the solvency ratio (SR), defined as the
relation between assets and liabilities of the system, must be equal to or greater than
1. In this particular case, the participants in the system would have reasonable ex-
pectations that the promises of payments would be respected, without the sponsor of
the system (the state government) having to make non-statutory contributions. How-
ever, if (Financial assets + Contribution assets) < (Liability to pensioners + Liability
to contributors) or the accumulated deficit is positive, the pension system is insolvent
(or unsustainable), and the promises of the participants might be broken without the
sponsorship of the government.
In Sweden, if the actuarial balance sheet reveals that the system is insolvent, an auto-
matic balance mechanism (ABM) will be triggered with the aim of reducing the growth
of the liabilities18.
17According to Knell et al. (2006), the term sustainability has many definitions, though it almost
always refers to the fiscal policies of a government, the public sector or the pension system. On the
other hand, the concept of solvency particularly refers to the ability of a pension scheme’s assets to
meet the scheme’s liabilities indicator. Henceforth we use the term sustainability when compiling the
United States’ actuarial balance methodology and solvency for the Swedish actuarial balance sheet
methodology. Solvency is a kind of sustainability.
18Detailed information on the Swedish ABM can be found in Swedish Pensions Agency (2013) and
Vidal-Melia´ et al. (2009).
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A description of the main entries on the actuarial balance sheet is provided below. The
formulae developed are based on Boado-Penas et al. (2008) but applied to Chinese
data.
Liabilities to Pensioners
Liabilities to pensioners are calculated as the present value of current and future pen-
sions for current pensioners. The formula to calculate liabilities to pensioners, V rt , is
expressed as follows:
V rt =
w−xe−A−1∑
k=0
P(xe+A+k,t)N(xe+A+k,t)a¨
λ
xe+A+k (4.1)
where w − 1 is the maximum age at which people can survive; xe is the entry age into
the pension system; P(xe+A+k,t) is the amount of the retirement pension at time t for
individuals aged xe+A+k; N(xe+A+k,t) is the number of pensioners aged xe+A+k at
time t, and a¨λxe+A+k is the present value of a lifetime annuity due of 1 per year payable
in advance growing at real rate λ, valued at age xe + A + k, with a technical interest
rate equal to δ.
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Liabilities to Contributors
Liabilities to contributors are calculated as the difference between the present value
of future pensions and future contributions19. The formula to calculate liabilities to
contributors, V ct , is expressed as follows:
V ct =
Future pensions︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(xe+A,t)N(xe+A,t)a¨
λ
xe+A
A∑
h=1
(
1 + g
1 + δ
)h
−
Future contributions︷ ︸︸ ︷
ct
A−1∑
k=0
k∑
h=0
N(xe+k,t)y(xe+k,t)
(
1 + g
1 + δ
)h
(4.2)
where P(xe+A,t) is the amount of initial pension for current contributors who retires
at time t; N(xe+A,t) is the number of current contributors who reach retirement at the
normal age xe + A at time t; a¨xe+A is the present value of a life annuity valued at age
xe + A; N(xe+k,t) is the number of contributors aged xe + k at time t; y(xe+k,t) is the
average salary for people aged xe + k at time t; ct is the contribution rate at t; g is the
growth rate of salary and δ is the discount rate.
Contribution Asset
The novel entry on the PAYG actuarial balance sheet is the contribution asset (CA)
defined by Settergren (2001, 2003), Settergren and Mikula (2005) and the literature of
Swedish Pensions Agency. The formula to calculate the contribution asset at time t,
19This method, also called prospective method, is used due to the DB nature of the Chinese PAYG
pension system. For more detailed information see Boado-Penas et al. (2008), Vidal-Melia´ et al. (2009)
and Boado-Penas and Vidal-Melia´ (2012).
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CAt , is expressed as:
CAt = TDt · Ct = (Art − Act) · Ct (4.3)
Where TDt20 is the turnover duration, which is the time expected to pass from a mon-
etary unit enters the system as a contribution until it leaves in the form of a pension; Ct
is total contribution revenue at year t; Art is the average weighted age for the pension-
ers (weighted by the amount of annual pensions considering the age-benefit profile),
and Act is the average weighted age for the contributors (weighted by the amount of
real contributions considering the age-earnings profile)21.
4.2.2 The United States’ Actuarial Balance Indicator (AB)
The main methodology used to compile the actuarial balance in non-financial DB sys-
tems could be described as an aggregate accounting projection model that compares the
spending on pensions with the income from contributions. It basically involves using
the forecast demographic scenario to determine the future evolution of the number of
contributors and pensioners according to the rules of the pension system. The macroe-
conomic scenario that determines the amounts of future contributions and pensions is
exogenous.
20Detailed information can be found in Boado-Penas et al. (2008) and Settergren and Mikula (2005).
21Formulae to calculate the average weighted ages for the pensioners and the contributors are provided
in Appendix D.
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The United States follows this methodology and has compiled an actuarial balance
annually since 1941 (The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age And Survivors Insurance
and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2012). The United States’ actuarial
balance indicator (AB) measures the system’s financial sustainability by measuring
the difference in present value, discounted at the projected yield, between spending on
pensions and income from contributions, taking into account that the level of financial
reserves at the end of the time horizon reaches a magnitude of one-year expenditure.
This value summarises the system’s financial deficit or surplus for the 75-year horizon.
Other countries such as Canada, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom also fol-
low the main aggregate accounting methodology, but some particularities and the way
in which the main results are presented differ from those in the United States actuarial
balance22.
The formula to calculate the United States’ AB is shown as follows:
AB =

TF0 +
Present value of Contributions︷ ︸︸ ︷
y0 ·
74∑
t=0
ct ·Nt ·
t∏
h=1
(1 + gh)
(1 + rh)
y0 ·
74∑
t=0
Nt ·
t∏
h=1
(1 + gh)
(1 + rh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Present value of payrolls

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Summarized Income Rate
−

Present value of benefits︷ ︸︸ ︷
P0 ·
74∑
t=0
Rt ·
t∏
h=1
(1 + λh)
(1 + rh)
+
74∏
h=1
(TF74)
(1+rh)
y0 ·
74∑
t=0
Nt ·
t∏
h=1
(1 + gh)
(1 + rh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Present value of payrolls

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Summarized Cost Rate
(4.4)
where TF0 denotes the value of assets in the trust fund at the beginning of the period;
ct is contribution rate at t; y0 denotes the contribution base at the beginning;Nt denotes
22See Boado-Penas and Vidal-Melia´ (2012).
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the number of contributors at year t; g is the annual wage growth rate; r is the projected
yield rate on trust fund assets; P0 denotes the average pension at the beginning; Rt
denotes the number of pensioners at year t, and λ is the annual indexation of pensions.
If AB > 0, then the system is sustainable for the next 75 years. If AB < 0, the system
is unsustainable.
4.3 Analysis of Chinese Pension System based on Swedish
Methodology
This section shows the first estimate of the actuarial balance sheet for the Chinese
pension system with the aim of producing a solvency ratio (SR) over the period 2007-
2012. A comparison with the Swedish pension system is also provided together with
some parametric reforms to restore the sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
4.3.1 Data and Assumptions
• The effective retirement age in China is 5323.
• Data on financial assets is obtained from National Social Security Fund Report
23In China, the effective retirement age does not coincide with the statutory normal retirement age
which is 60 for men and 50 for women. For detailed information on the effective retirement age, see
“Enterprise Retiree Basic Situation Investigation” published by Ministry of Labor and Social Security
of the People’s Republic of China (2006).
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(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic
of China, 2012b), while contribution revenues are from Human Resources and
Social Security Statistics Bulletin (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Se-
curity of the People’s Republic of China, 2012a).
• The total number of contributors is obtained from Human Resources and So-
cial Security Statistics Bulletin. We assume that the distribution of the number
of contributors per age group follows the same age distribution as the number
of urban employed workers24. Distribution of urban employed workers per age
group is from China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook 2012 (De-
partment of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics
of China, 2013).
• The total number of pensioners is obtained from Human Resources and Social
Security Statistics Bulletin. Distribution of pensioners per age group follows the
same distribution for urban people aged over 53. Distribution for urban people
aged over 53 per age group is from China Population and Employment Statistics
Yearbook.
• Data on the average monthly wage25 for current workers is from National Bureau
of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. Wage distribution per age group
is from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s
24In China, not all the urban employed workers are covered by the pension system, though the Chinese
government is trying to cover all the workers in the future. Currently the number of contributors is less
than the number of urban employed workers
25The terms contribution base, salary and wage are used as synonyms in this thesis.
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Republic of China. Salaries are kept constant in real terms per age group.
• The mortality tables are from China Population and Employment Statistics Year-
book26.
• It is assumed that once individuals enter the labour market, they contribute
throughout their working lives with 100% density.
• The discount rate for future pensions and contributions should be consistent with
the one for the contribution asset, and this rate is assumed to be 0%. It should be
noted that the system’s SR depends on the relation between assets and liabilities
and not the exact amount of assets and liabilities (Boado-Penas et al., 2008).
• We assume that the number of contribution years is equal to 33 in the normal
scenario27.
4.3.2 SR for China
Table 4.2 shows that the SR for China is always around 0.4 over the period 2007-2012,
which means the total liabilities are more than double the total assets. This implies that
the Chinese pension system is insolvent. At the same time, the degree of funding of the
26The mortality tables for China from China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook are
provided in Appendix E.
27This assumption is made following the advice of the experts on the Chinese pension system in 2014.
The legal retirement age for men (60) and women (50) are used to calculate the total contribution years.
Information on the calculation of the contribution years is provided in Appendix F.
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Chinese PAYG pension system remains low, barely reaching 2.05% in 2012, while in
Sweden, the degree of funding is 12.05% in 2012 as shown in Table 4.3. The share of
liabilities to contributors within total liabilities is 56% in China, which is 9.1% points
lower than in the Swedish pension system.
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Table 4.2: Balance sheet for the Chinese pension system at 31 December each year
Contribution Years = 33 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Asset (% of GDP)
Financial asset 2.30 2.60 3.14 3.49 3.75 4.22
Contribution asset 58.84 61.10 67.91 68.90 72.81 76.73
Accumulated deficit 84.28 84.28 93.96 111.00 109.30 113.79
‘Loss for the period’ 0.00 9.68 17.04 -1.70 4.49 11.14
Total assets 145.42 157.66 182.06 181.70 190.35 205.88
Liabilities (% of GDP)
Liability to pensioners 64.15 69.76 80.67 83.25 84.54 90.63
Liability to contributors 81.27 87.90 101.39 98.44 105.81 115.25
Total liabilities 145.42 157.66 182.06 181.70 190.35 205.88
Funding, solvency and liquidity
indicators
Ratio of (in)solvency 0.420 0.404 0.390 0.398 0.402 0.393
(assets/liabilities)
Degree of funding(%) 1.58 1.65 1.73 1.92 1.97 2.05
(financial asset/liabilities)
Liabilities to contributors/ 55.9 55.8 55.7 54.2 55.6 56.0
liabilities(%)
Own source
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Table 4.3: Balance sheet for the Swedish pension system at 31 December each year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Asset (% of GDP)
Financial asset 28.7 22.1 26.6 26.8 25.1 27.0
Contribution asset 195.6 202.2 204.8 197.0 196.2 194.8
Total assets 224.4 224.2 231.5 223.8 221.2 221.8
Liabilities (% of GDP)
Liability to pensioners 66.8 70.9 80.8 76.9 74.1 78.2
Liability to contributors 157.0 161.0 161.0 143.7 142.6 145.8
Accumulated surplus 0.6 0.6 -7.8 -9.7 3.0 4.4
Change in net worth 0.0 -8.2 -2.6 12.8 1.6 -6.6
Total liabilities 224.4 224.2 231.5 223.8 221.2 221.8
Funding, solvency and liquidity
indicators
Ratio of (in)solvency 1.00 0.97 0.96 1.01 1.02 0.99
(assets/liabilities)
Degree of funding(%) 12.84 9.52 11.01 12.15 11.57 12.05
(financial asset/liabilities)
Liabilities to contributors/ 70.17 69.43 66.59 65.14 65.82 65.10
liabilities(%)
Own source based on Swedish Pensions Agency (2013)
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The evolution of total assets, total liabilities and accumulated deficits for the Chinese
PAYG pension system is given in Figure 4.1. We can see that both assets and liabilities
are increasing over the period 2007-2012, but the total liabilities increased at a higher
rate than total assets, causing an increase of the accumulated deficit.
Figure 4.1: Evolution of assets, liabilities and accumulated deficits for the Chinese
pension system
Own source
Comparison between China and Sweden
Figure 4.2 shows a comparison of the contribution asset, total liabilities, accumulated
surpluses or deficits and the SR between China and Sweden from 2007 to 2012.
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We can see that the gap between contribution assets and total liabilities is decreasing
for Sweden in Figure 4.2a, but this gap is increasing for China and represents 130%
of the GDP in 2012 in Figure 4.2b. As shown in Figure 4.2c, China accumulates a
large amount of deficit which makes the SR lower than one (See Figure 4.2d) while
Sweden is managing to keep a small deficit for some years and a SR always around 128.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of the results between Sweden and China
(a) Contribution Asset and total liabilities for Sweden
28In Sweden if for some reason the solvency ratio is less than 1 the ABM is triggered. This consists
basically of reducing the growth in pension liability, i.e. the pensions in payment and the contributors’
notional capital. See Settergren (2001).
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(b) Contribution Asset and total liabilities for China
(c) Comparison of accumulated surpluses or deficits between Sweden and China
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(d) Comparison of SRs between Sweden and China
Sensitivity Analysis for ‘More contribution years’ and ‘Fewer contribution years’
This subsection provides a sensitivity analysis for different numbers of contribution
years. Due to the lack of accurate data for contribution years, we are interested in how
the number of contribution years might affect the SR under the current rules of the
Chinese pension system. The expression to calculate the total number of contribution
years under different scenarios is provided in Appendix F.
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show the results of actuarial balance sheets under the scenarios of
‘More contribution years’, i.e. 35 years and ‘Fewer contribution years’, i.e. 29 years.
The results show that the Chinese solvency ratio keeps quite stable under the different
scenarios, that is around 0.4, which again indicates the insolvency of the system under
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the different scenarios analysed.
Table 4.4: Balance sheet for the Chinese pension system at 31 December each year
under ‘More contribution years’ scenario
Contribution Years = 35 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Asset (% of GDP)
Financial asset 2.30 2.60 3.14 3.49 3.75 4.22
Contribution asset 60.05 62.29 69.13 70.03 73.76 77.61
Accumulated deficit 88.68 88.68 98.93 116.98 115.51 121.21
‘Loss for the period’ 0.00 10.26 18.04 -1.46 5.70 12.20
Total assets 151.02 163.82 189.24 189.04 198.71 215.23
Liabilities (% of GDP)
Liability to pensioners 64.15 69.76 80.67 83.25 84.54 90.63
Liability to contributors 86.87 94.07 108.58 105.78 114.18 124.60
Total liabilities 151.02 163.82 189.24 189.04 198.71 215.23
Funding, solvency and liquidity
indicators
Ratio of (in)solvency 0.413 0.396 0.382 0.389 0.390 0.380
(assets/liabilities)
Degree of funding(%) 1.52 1.59 1.66 1.85 1.89 1.96
(financial asset/liabilities)
Liabilities to contributors/ 57.5 57.4 57.4 56.0 57.5 57.9
liabilities(%)
Own source
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Table 4.5: Balance sheet for the Chinese pension system at 31 December each year
under ‘Fewer contribution years’ scenario
Contribution Years = 29 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Asset (% of GDP)
Financial asset 2.30 2.60 3.14 3.49 3.75 4.22
Contribution asset 55.95 57.95 64.22 64.74 68.27 72.31
Accumulated deficit 76.44 76.44 85.79 102.11 101.67 105.80
‘Loss for the period’ 0.00 9.35 16.31 -0.44 4.13 9.24
Total assets 134.69 146.34 169.47 169.90 177.82 191.57
Liabilities (% of GDP)
Liability to pensioners 64.15 69.76 80.67 83.25 84.54 90.63
Liability to contributors 70.54 76.58 88.80 86.65 93.28 100.94
Total liabilities 134.69 146.34 169.47 169.90 177.82 191.57
Funding, solvency and liquidity
indicators
Ratio of (in)solvency 0.432 0.414 0.397 0.402 0.405 0.399
(assets/liabilities)
Degree of funding(%) 1.71 1.78 1.85 2.06 2.11 2.20
(financial asset/liabilities)
Liabilities to contributors/ 52.4 52.3 52.4 51.0 52.5 52.7
liabilities(%)
Own source
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4.3.3 Parametric Reforms based on SR for China
The results of the Chinese actuarial balance sheets show that the current Chinese PAYG
pension system is insolvent. Therefore some parametric reforms should be undertaken
immediately to improve the system’s solvency in the long term. If only one of the
parametric measures is modified, the contribution rate (CR) would need to increase by
15%, or the retirement age would need to increase to 66, in order to achieve a SR closet
to one. Obviously parametric reforms of only one decision variable taken in isolation
are unfeasible in practice.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the SRs for China when two variables are modified si-
multaneously in the parametric reforms. We can see that if two measures were taken
simultaneously, under the current replacement rate (RR), the SR would be close to 1
(i.e. 1.007) when the effective retirement age increases from 53 to 63 and the indexa-
tion of pensions decreases at an annual rate of 10%.
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Table 4.6: Solvency ratio (SR) for the Chinese pension system after changes in the
parametric measures
RR λ Retirement Age
Item
31% 22% 18% 0% -10% -20% 53 60 63
= 0.393 0.539 0.649 0.393 0.455 0.539 0.393 0.613 0.790
5% 0.533 0.758 0.938 0.533 0.626 0.758 0.533 0.946 1.372
10% 0.703 1.046 1.346 0.703 0.841 1.046 0.703 1.497 2.742
CR
15% 0.914 1.444 1.963 0.914 1.119 1.444 0.914 2.590 9.869
31% 0.393 0.455 0.539 0.393 0.613 0.790
22% 0.633 0.766 0.539 0.913 1.265RR
18% 0.770 0.948 0.649 1.175 1.744
0% 0.393 0.613 0.790
-10% 0.455 0.747 1.007λ
-20% 0.539 0.956 1.386
Own source
Note: The SRs within the range [0.9, 1.1] are highlighted in the table.
A possibility to restore the solvency if three parametric measures were taken simulta-
neously securing a replacement rate of 50% would be an increase of the retirement age
to 60, an increase of the CR by 6%, and at the same time a decrease in the indexation
of pensions by 10%:
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4.4 Analysis of Chinese Pension System based on United
States’ Methodology
This section shows the results of the actuarial balance indicator (AB) for Chinese pen-
sion system following the United States’ methodology. A comparison with the United
States’ pension system is also provided together with some parametric reforms to re-
store the sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
4.4.1 Data and Assumptions
• Annual real wage growth rate, g, annual real indexation of pensions, λ, and
projected yield rate, r, for the Chinese pension fund are assumed to keep constant
at the last 20 years average rates, i.e. 7.62%, 9.13% and 3% respectively.
• The projected data on the population of China is obtained from United Nations
(2012).
• The population projections under the ‘Normal Scenario’ follow the structure of
‘Medium Variant’ (Medium fertility, normal mortality, normal international mi-
gration) from United Nations (2012). Under this projection, the dependency
ratio increases from 32% in 2012 to 122% at the end of the analysed period.
100
4.4.2 AB for China
Table 4.7 shows the calculation of AB in the ‘Normal Scenario’ for China and com-
pares it with the United States over the period 2012-2087. The AB for China in the
year 2012 is -39.09%, which means that the current CR in China should be immedi-
ately increased by 39.09% to make the Chinese PAYG pension system sustainable, and
therefore the CR in China should be 59.09%. At the same time, the AB for the United
States in 2012 is equal to -2.67%, meaning that the United States only needs to increase
the CR to 15.91% to make its pension system sustainable over the next 75 years. As
a result, the current Chinese PAYG pension system is quite unsustainable compared
to the United States, though China will have one year more than the United States for
the reserve fund to be exhausted in 2034, and the year of first deficit is 13 years later
than the United States, i.e. 202529. As for the year 2012, the income from contribu-
tions exceeds spending on pensions, generating a surplus of 100.4 billion RMB for the
Chinese pension system.
Sensitivity Analysis for the Chinese Actuarial Balance Indicator
Table 4.8 shows the calculation of the Chinese AB under two new different demo-
graphic scenarios: ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ scenarios. The projections under ‘op-
timistic scenario’ assume a dependency ratio constant and equal to 32% as in the cur-
rent year 2012 (beginning of the analysis). While the projections under the ‘pessimistic
29In 2025 the income from contributions is 356.9 billion RMB while the spending on pensions is
392.5 billion RMB in China.
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Table 4.7: Elements of the 75-year actuarial balance 2012-2087 for China and United States.
Present value at January 2012.
Items China US
(RMB in billions) (Dollar in billions)
1 Income from contributions 717,977 45,198
2 Spending on pensions 2,027,633 56,477
3=1-2 Initial deficit -1,309,656 -11,278
4 Trust fund assets at start of period 2,190 2,678
5=3+4 Open group unfunded obligation -1,307,466 -8,601
6 Ending target trust fund 95,982 501
7=5-6 Results for the period -1,403,448 -9,101
8 Aggregate contribution bases 3,589,883 341,465
9=(1+4)/8 Summarized income rate 20.06% 14.02%
10=(2+6)/8 Summarized cost rate 59.15% 16.69%
11=9-10 Actuarial Balance (AB) -39.09% -2.67%
12 Year of first deficit 2025 2012
13 Reserve fund exhausted (year) 2034 2033
Own source. The result of United States is from The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age And
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2012).
scenario’ assume that the population projections follows a ‘low variant’ (low fertility,
normal mortality, normal international migration) structure of United Nations (2012).
This assumption will give us a pessimistic scenario with the number of contributors
decreasing in the next 75 years, giving a dependency ratio of 198% at the end of the
period.
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Table 4.8: Elements of the 75-year actuarial balance 2012-2087 for China under different
scenarios. Present value at January 2012. Unit: RMB in billions
Items Optimistic Normal Pessimistic
1 Income from contributions 948,870 717,977 678,039
2 Spending on pensions 1,092,022 2,027,633 2,169,667
3=1-2 Initial deficit -143,152 -1,309,656 -1,491,628
4 Trust fund assets at start of period 2,190 2,190 2,680
5=3+4 Open group unfunded obligation -140,962 -1,307,466 -1,488,948
6 Ending target trust fund 57,170 95,982 112,452
7=5-6 Results for the period -198,132 -1,403,448 -1,601,400
8 Aggregate contribution bases 4,744,349 3,589,883 3,390,194
9=(1+4)/8 Summarized income rate 20.04% 20.06% 20.08%
10=(2+6)/8 Summarized cost rate 24.22% 59.15% 67.32%
11=9-10 Actuarial Balance (AB) -4.18% -39.09% -47.24%
Dependency Ratio at year 2087 32% 122% 198%
Own source
In the ‘optimistic scenario’, when the assumed demographic structure is kept constant
for the next 75 years as in 2012, the AB for China is -4.18%, which means the Chinese
pension system is not sustainable even in the case of the ‘optimistic scenario’. In
the ‘pessimistic scenario’, the AB for China is equal to -47.24%. Although the AB
changes a lot under different scenarios, the summarised income rate is more or less
the same, thus the major change of AB comes from the summarised cost rate, i.e. the
present value of future pensions needed to be paid and the end target pension fund as a
percentage of the present value of contribution bases.
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Since the ageing problem is one of the most important problems for the future of the
Chinese PAYG pension system, this sensitivity analysis only considers the different
scenarios for demographic structure changes. Further research could focus on macroe-
conomic variable changes, consideration of which is beyond the scope of this chapter30.
4.4.3 Parametric Reforms based on AB for China
Since the AB for China indicates that the current Chinese PAYG pension system is
not sustainable under all the scenarios analysed, some parametric reforms need to be
implemented immediately to make the system sustainable in the future. If only one
parametric measure was undertaken, then the CR should be increased by 39.09% to
restore the sustainability of the system, as shown in Table 4.7. Another possibility
would be an increase in the retirement age to 66.
However, two parametric measures could be undertaken simultaneously, to make a
relatively smooth reform, as shown in Table 4.9. We can see that the Chinese pension
system would be sustainable (AB = 4.7%) when the CR increases by 20% and the
indexation of pensions decreases at an annual rate of 1%.
30To give just a few examples so as not to go into great length, the AB would be -18.83% if the values
for salary growth and indexation on pensions were 5 percentage points lower, i.e. 2.63% and 4.13%
respectively.
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Table 4.9: Actuarial balance indicator (AB) for the Chinese pension system after
changes in the parametric measures
RR λ Retirement Age
Item
31% 25% 20% 0% -1% -2% 62 64 66
= -39.0% -27.7% -18.1% -39.0% -15.3% -1.4% -21.7% -7.7% 1.3%
10% -29.1% -17.7% -8.1% -29.1% -5.3% 8.6% -11.7% 2.3% 11.3%
15% -24.1% -12.7% -3.1% -24.1% -0.3% 13.6% -6.7% 7.3% 16.3%
CR
20% -19.1% -7.7% 1.9% -19.1% 4.7% 18.6% -1.7% 12.3% 21.3%
31% -39.0% -15.3% -1.4% -21.7% -7.7% 1.3%
25% -27.7% -8.4% 2.7% -13.6% 2.3% 4.9%RR
20% -18.1% -2.7% 6.2% -6.9% 2.2% 7.9%
0% -21.7% -7.7% 1.3%
-1% -4.9% 3.6% 8.9%λ
-2% 4.9% 10.1% 13.3%
Own source
Note: Highlighted boxes are the results of AB for China within the range [-8%, 8%].
4.5 Summary
Restoring the sustainability of a PAYG pension system is on the agenda for most gov-
ernments and China is no exception. This chapter uses two actuarial balance method-
ologies to evaluate the real situation of the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension
system in the urban area over the period 2007-2012.
The actuarial balance sheet for the Chinese pension system, based on the verifiable
facts, shows that the total liabilities of the current Chinese PAYG pension system are
more than double its assets, which implies that the system is insolvent.
The United States’ model, which takes into account the demographic and economic
projections, shows that the current contribution rate in China should be immediately
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increased by 39.09% to make the Chinese pension system sustainable in the next 75
years. Even in the optimistic scenario, when the demographic structure is kept con-
stant, the Chinese pension system is not sustainable in the long term.
As a result, no matter under which model, the Chinese pension system shows a weak
position of financial health and the results presented indicate that the need to adopt
measures to restore solvency/sustainability is urgent.
This chapter also provides the advice on some parametric reforms to adjust the system
on the road to long-term financial stability. The reforms presented are linked to the
solvency ratio (SR) for the case of the Swedish methodology and the actuarial balance
indicator (AB) for the United States’ model.
The absence of an actuarial balance in the case of China also produces a ‘mirage effect’
and reduces the importance of future cash deficit because currently the income from
contributions exceeds the expenditure on pensions. This generates a surplus of 100.4
billion RMB in the year 2012 for the Chinese pension system and might delay effective
measures being taken to restore solvency/sustainability to the system.
Future research is focused on making the reforms (in this case also called ABM) more
applicable through smoother changes of the key variables such as the contribution
rate, retirement age and indexation of pensions. The methodology, based on non-
linear optimization models, calculate an optimal paths of these key variables to restore
the sustainability of the system. It is remarkable that Pozen (2013) stated that the
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relaxation of the one-child policy would restore the sustainability of the system. With
this in mind, using the cohort component method and the optimization model, we will
be able to assess the consequences of the one-child policy and other different fertility
policies on the sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
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Chapter 5
Implications of One-Child Policy
In 1979, the Chinese government introduced the one-child policy with the aim of con-
trolling the country’s rapid population growth. This policy will lead to deficits in the
Chinese pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system since the country’s individuals are liv-
ing longer and having fewer children. This chapter analyses the impact of different
demographic policies on the long-term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension
system. Using the cohort component projection method, we forecast three different
population structures and design automatic balancing mechanism (ABM) to restore
the financial equilibrium of the system. The main finding is that, in all the scenar-
ios studied, there is an urgent need to introduce some mechanisms to guarantee the
long-term sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
108
5.1 Introduction
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1st 1949, China
has experienced significant demographic changes. After an initial period of very high
fertility, total fertility rates dropped from 6.11 in 1950 to 3.01 in 1979 (See Figure 3.3)
when the one-child policy was first implemented with the aim of controlling rapid
population growth (United Nations, 2015).
The consequences of the one-child policy on the Chinese economic growth have been
widely discussed during the last three decades after its implementation. The contribu-
tion to the economic growth after its first implementation has been confirmed by some
authors. McElroy and Yang (2000) and Li et al. (2005) state that the one-child policy,
by means of a reduction in the fertility rates and a control in the population growth,
has contributed to the economic growth and has improved living standards for many
Chinese families. Following this line of argument, Li and Zhang (2007) also find that
high birth rates have a negative impact on the economic growth, and thus the one-child
policy is indeed growth enhancing. However, some problems have emerged recently
after 30 years implementation of the policy. For example, the one-child policy has led
to the decreasing number of the working-age population, and hence caused the labour
shortage in the market. Thus, some authors raise the concerns about the compatibility
of the one-child policy with the country’s long-term economic growth in the future.
Bloom and Williamson (1998) claim that the previous economic growth brought about
by the one-child policy would be dissipated by the rising volume of elderly individuals
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in the future. Also, Howden and Zhou (2014) state that China is currently facing a
serious labour shortage, with the first working population decrease occurring in 2012,
and this is not compatible with its objective of economic advancement.
The one-child policy has become increasingly unpopular due to both the country’s age-
ing population and the shortage in the labour market. For these reasons, in December
2013 the one-child policy was adjusted to promote the long-term balanced develop-
ment of the population in China.
The population structure of a country has a major impact on the sustainability of a
PAYG pension system where the current active workers pay the benefits for the current
pensioners. Thus, a decrease in the number of contributors and an increase in the
number of pensioners, i.e. an increase in the old-age dependency ratio would lead to
deficits in the Chinese pension system.
China has already taken some steps to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the
pension system, such as, introducing longevity insurance annuities and decreasing the
replacement rates (RR). Also, an increase in the retirement age from 50 (for women)
and 60 (for men) to 65 for both sexes is being considered, and the introduction of an
NDC scheme has recently been proposed. However, Cai and Du (2015) and Howden
and Zhou (2014) argue that these actions may be insufficient to deal with the labour
shortage and ageing problem faced by the Chinese population.
This chapter aims to fill a gap in the literature by investigating the consequences of
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fertility policies on the long-term sustainability of the Chinese urban PAYG pension
system for old-age contingency. With this aim in mind, we analyse the sustainability
of the Chinese pension system under three different demographic scenarios–‘The one-
child policy implemented in 1979’, ‘Relaxation of the one-child policy implemented
in 2013’ and ‘No implementation of any fertility policy’. Following the paper by
Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016a), we calculate the optimal paths (also called ABM) of
the main variables (contribution rate, retirement age and indexation of pensions) that
make the pension system sustainable under the three demographic scenarios during
the 75-year period from 2012 to 2087. An analysis of the optimal values of the main
variables will provide us with a clear view of the impact of different demographic
policies on the sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we describe the
history and evolution of the fertility policies in China. In Section 5.3, we describe
the cohort component method for population projection and calculate the population
pyramids under the three demographic scenarios. In Section 5.4, following the method-
ology used by Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016a), we calculate the optimal paths for the
contribution rate, retirement age and indexation of pensions under the different demo-
graphic structures. Section 5.5 provides the conclusions and makes recommendations
on reforms under the different population scenarios.
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5.2 History of One-Child Policy
The People’s Republic of China was founded on October 1st 1949, when the commu-
nists came to power. In order to consolidate the power and build a stronger socialist
state, the president Mao Zedong, with the idea that more people meant additional num-
bers to fight against capitalism, encouraged people to have more children. As a result,
the total fertility rate, as shown in Figure 3.3, reached the value of 6.11 in the 1950s
and the population nearly doubled during the period 1950-1970 according to United
Nations (2015).
In the early 1970s, the Chinese government began to control its rapid population
growth with the ‘Later, Longer and Fewer’ program that encouraged people to get
married later, have longer intervals between births and have fewer children. However,
this program did not reach its goal of reducing population growth rate as was originally
intended. Therefore, the Chinese government formally introduced the one-child policy
as a family planning policy which directly targets the number of children per family in
197931. As a result of the implementation of this policy, the total fertility rate fell from
3.01 in 1979 to 1.55 in 2010 as shown in Figure 3.3.
In December 2013, since the one-child policy was causing a continuing decrease in the
31This program included both incentives and penalties to assure that couples produced only one child.
In addition to free contraceptives, abortions and sterilizations, families that followed the policy could
get an allowance until the child reached the age of 14. Also the child had the priority access to schools,
college, employment, healthcare and housing. The penalties, including steep fines, were imposed on
couples that had a second child. See Banister (1987), Chen and Kols (1982), and Lin and Zhou (1984)
for more detailed information.
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size of the working-age population, the Chinese central government decided to relax32
partially the one-child policy. This partial relaxation of the policy allowed families to
have two children if one parent, rather than both parents, was an only child in his/her
family.
On October 29th 2015, with the aim of dealing with the ageing population, the Chi-
nese central government went further and decided to abolish the one-child policy, now
allowing all families to have two children.
5.3 Population Projections under Different Demographic
Scenarios from 2012 to 2087
In this section, we introduce the cohort component method and apply it to calculate
population pyramids in China over the period 2012-2087 under the following three de-
mographic scenarios: ‘One-child policy is implemented as in 1979’, ‘One-child policy
is adjusted as in 2013’ and ‘No fertility policy has implemented since 1979’.
32See the ‘Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Resolution on the Adjustment
and Improvement of Fertility Policy’ from The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of
China (2013)
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5.3.1 The Cohort Component Method
The cohort component method has been widely used because it provides a flexible
and powerful approach for population projection33. It provides projections not only of
total population but also of the demographic composition and individual components
of growth (Smith et al., 2013). The earliest applications of this method can be dated
back to 1895 for United Kingdom (Bowley, 1924; Cannan, 1895), and 1928 for United
States (Whelpton, 1928). The Office for National Statistics in countries such as United
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Spain and the United States, inter alia, also use this method
to forecast population size and structure.
Mathematically, we calculate total population at year t+ 1, N(t+ 1), as follows:
N(t+ 1) = N(t) +B(t)−D(t) +M(t) (5.1)
WhereN(t) is the total number of population at year t; B(t) is the total number of new
births during year t; D(t) is the number of deaths during year t, and M(t) is the net
number of migrants during year t. The illustration of the cohort component method is
provided in Appendix G.
33A cohort can be defined as a group of people who experience the same demographic event during a
particular period of time and who may be identified at later dates on the basis of this common experience
(Shryock et al., 1973).
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5.3.2 Main Data and Scenarios Analysed
• Survival rates and net migration rates are both obtained from United Nations
(2015)34.
• Scenario 1: Fertility rates under the one-child policy implemented as in 1979
are obtained from United Nations (2015), with the projected total fertility rates
for China varying from 1.55 in 2012 to 1.81 in 2087, as shown in Figure 5.1
(Scenario 1)35.
• Scenario 2: Fertility rates follow the one-child policy adjusted in 2013. The total
fertility rates are assumed to be equal to 2 (See Figure 5.1: Scenario 2)36.
• Scenario 3: It is assumed that no fertility policy has been in place since 1979,
and therefore annual total fertility rates are assumed to be constant and equal
to 3.01, i.e. the value of the total fertility rate in 1979 just before the one-child
policy was implemented (See Figure 5.1: Scenario 3).
• For an easy comparison between the one-child policy and its adjustment, the
34Data from United Nations is used due to the fact that the Chinese Ministry does not carry out
projections on survival rates, fertility rates and migration rates. The survival rates is obtained from the
life table (United Nations, 2015), which takes into account the infant mortality. Data on the survival
rates are provided in Appendix H.
35United Nations (2015) considers the one-child policy in their projections. The one-child policy has
been relaxed since 2013, thus this scenario is unrealistic to be kept in the future. However, our aim in
this chapter is to compare the different demographic scenarios, and to study the consequences of the
one-child policy.
36Our aim is not to accurately forecast the future population in China but to analyse how different
fertility policies might affect the sustainability of the system. Therefore, the fertility rate assumed in
Scenario 2 is exactly equal to the target value of the adjusted policy.
115
population pyramids are provided taking 2012 as an initial point (just before the
adjusted one-child policy was introduced).
Figure 5.1: Projected total fertility rates under three demographic scenarios, 2012-
2087
Own source
5.3.3 Results
Figure 5.2 shows the projections of old-age dependency ratios over the period 2012-
2087 under different demographic scenarios, when the old age population is above the
effective retirement age of 53 and the entry age to the labor market starts at 16. In
2012 the dependency ratio is 34.81% for both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, i.e. 2.87
contributors finance one pensioner, whereas its value is 31.84% in the case of Scenario
3, i.e. 3.14 contributors finance one pensioner.
In 2087, the old-age dependency ratios under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are equal to
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124.94% and 104.77% respectively, i.e. there will be more pensioners than contribu-
tors at the end of the period of study, while its value is lower (81.01%) if no policy had
been implemented (Scenario 3).
Figure 5.2: Old-age dependency ratios (aged 53+/aged 16-52) under different demo-
graphic scenarios, 2012-2087
Own source
We can see that for all the demographic scenarios considered, the old-age dependency
ratio will dramatically increase over the period 2012-2087, and this will have a negative
impact on the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system. Figure 5.3 shows the
population pyramids under the three demographic scenarios in 2012, 2050 and 2087.
We can see that the number of the old-age population are increasing more rapidly under
Scenario 1 than under the other two scenarios.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of population pyramids under different demographic scenarios
(a) Scenario 1: One-child policy
(b) Scenario 2: Adjusted one-child policy
(c) Scenario 3: No fertility policy
Own source
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5.4 Automatic Balancing Mechanism (ABM) to Restore
the Sustainability
PAYG pension systems operate financially through the current active workers paying
contributions which are used to pay pensions to the current pensioners. It is clear that
the increased longevity of pensioners and decreases in the size of the working popula-
tion will lead to PAYG pension systems becoming unsustainable. This is a worldwide
problem, and many countries have already carried out some parametric reforms. As
noted earlier, China has also tried to solve this ageing problem by decreasing the re-
placement rates and increasing the retirement age37.
In this context, automatic balancing mechanism (ABM), are defined as a set of prede-
termined measures established by law to be applied immediately as required according
to an indicator that reflects the financial health of the system (Vidal-Melia´ et al., 2009).
Countries, such as Sweden, Germany and Japan, amongst others, have already set up an
ABM with the aim of re-establishing the financial equilibrium of their systems38. This
section follows the theoretical ABM introduced by Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016a) to
analyse the consequences of different demographic policies on the sustainability of the
Chinese pension system.
37See Chomik and Piggott (2015) and Hujo and Cook (2012) for pension reforms in Asian countries.
For pension reforms in the world, please refer to Holzmann (2013).
38See Vidal-Melia´ et al. (2009, 2010) and OECD (2012) for more details on ABM.
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5.4.1 Mechanism
This section introduces the ABM from Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016a) to restore not
only the financial sustainability of the PAYG pension system in the long term but also
the liquidity on an annual basis39.
This mechanism identifies the optimal paths of the three key decision variables (contri-
bution rate, ct , retirement age, x
(r)
t , and indexation of pensions, λt ) while minimizing
the net present value of the buffer fund, Ft , subject to some constraints.
The buffer fund is calculated as:
Ft = (1 + Jt)Ft−1 + ctWt(gt, x
(r)
t )− Et(gt, x(r)t , λt) (5.2)
where Wt(gt, x
(r)
t ) is the total contribution base40 paid at t that depends on the growth
of salaries, gt, and the retirement age, x
(r)
t ; Et(gt, x
(r)
t , λt) is the total expenditure on
pensions at t that depends on the growth of salaries, gt, the retirement age, x
(r)
t , and the
indexation of pensions, λt; ct is the contribution rate at t; Jt is the return of the fund at
t.
Lower and upper bounds, cmin, x
(r)
min, λmin ∈ R, and cmax, x(r)max, λmax ∈ R, respec-
tively, are imposed in order to avoid unrealistic values in the key variables of the pen-
39This paper extends the optimization model developed by Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016b) which
focused only on the liquidity of the system in a 20-year time horizon.
40The total contribution base is defined as the total wages of the working population.
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sion system. Also, smooth constraints are set as c1M ≤ ct+1ct ≤ c2M; x
(r)
1M ≤ x
(r)
t+1
x
(r)
t
≤ x(r)2M ;
λ1M ≤ λt+1λt ≤ λ2M to prevent jumps in optimal paths of the contribution rate, age of
retirement and indexation of pensions respectively. c1M, c2M, x
(r)
1M , x
(r)
2M , λ1M, λ2M ∈ R.
The liquidity41 constraint is set as Ft ≥ 0, for all t, i.e. no deficit is allowed in the
Chinese pension system.
The ABM is defined as the following optimization problem:
min
ct,x
(r)
t ,λt
T∑
t=0
Ft(ct, gt, x
(r)
t , λt, Jt)
(1 + δ)t
s.t. =

cmin ≤ ct ≤ cmax;
x
(r)
min ≤ x(r)t ≤ x(r)max;
λmin ≤ λt ≤ λmax;
c1M ≤ ct+1ct ≤ c2M;
x
(r)
1M ≤ x
(r)
t+1
x
(r)
t
≤ x(r)2M ;
λ1M ≤ λt+1λt ≤ λ2M;
Ft ≥ 0.
(5.3)
where δ > 0 is the discount rate.
41Liquidity is the short run financial equilibrium, i.e. each year’s contribution is greater than each
year’s expenditure in the pension system.
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5.4.2 Data and Assumptions
• Data on the number of participants in the Chinese contributory PAYG pension
system in urban areas is obtained from Human Resources and Social Security
Statistics Bulletin 2012 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of
the People’s Republic of China, 2012a).
• Data on the average salary is obtained from National Bureau of Statistics of the
People’s Republic of China, and its value in 2012 is equal to 47,593 RMB/year.
The information on wage distribution by age group is taken from the Ministry
of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China.
Annual real wage growth rate, gt , is assumed to remain constant and equal to
the average rates of the last 20 years, i.e. 7.62%. The initial contribution rate,
ct, for the Chinese contributory PAYG pension system in the urban area is 20%,
and it is paid entirely by the employer.
• Data on the average monthly pension is from National Social Security Fund
Report 2012 (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s
Republic of China, 2012b), and its value is equal to 1,721 RMB/month (20,652
RMB/year). The initial pension is equal to 61% of the average salary in the
Chinese PAYG pension system, i.e. the replacement rate is equal to 61%. The
initial revaluation of pension in payments, λt , is equal to the average rates of the
last 20 years, i.e. 9.13%. The initial effective retirement age in China is 53.
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• Data on the initial amount of buffer fund is from National Social Security Fund
Report 2012. The growth rate of the pension fund, Jt, is assumed to be 3%
which is equal to the 1-year fixed-term deposit rate given by The People’s Bank
of China42. The discount rate, δ, is also equal to 3%43.
• The lower bounds of the contribution rate, retirement age, and indexation of
pensions are equal to 20%, 53, and -10% respectively, whereas the upper bounds
are set respectively as 65%, 70, and 10%, in the case of only one decision vari-
ables is modified. While three variables are modified simultaneously, the lower
bounds are given by 20%, 53, and 0% respectively, and upper bounds are 30%,
60, and 10% respectively.
• The maximum increase for contribution rate and retirement age in each year is
assumed to be 2.5% and 6 months, whereas the minimum decrease for pension
in payment is set to be -1%, in the case of only one decision variable is modified.
The constraints are assumed to be 2.5%, 3 months and -0.5% respectively when
three variables are modified simultaneously.
5.4.3 Results
This subsection presents the results of the optimal paths for the key decision variables
under the different demographic scenarios for China. First, we show the results when
42The buffer fund is invested mostly in the bank with an interest rate equal to 3% in 2012.
43The discount rate is equal to 3% as the 1-year fixed-term deposit rate provided by The People’s
Bank of China, which is taken as a risk-free rate.
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only one decision variable is modified. Second, the results when three parameters are
modified simultaneously are shown. We also carried out a sensitivity analysis for the
value of return rate of buffer fund (Jt), and the replacement rate (RR).
ABM with Only One Modified Decision Variable
As shown in Figure 5.4a, if the contribution rate is the only decision variable, it would
need to increase to 59.36% in 2087 under Scenario 1. Its value would stabilize at
42.53% under Scenario 3 whereas it would need to increase to 54.55% under Scenario
2.
Figure 5.4b shows that the retirement age stabilizes at 65.90 under Scenario 2 whereas
its value would need to increase to 67.89 in the case of Scenario 1. If the indexation
of pensions was the only decision variable, as shown in Figure 5.4c, the pensions in
payment would need to decrease at an annual rate of 3% from 2025 to the end of the
period of study under Scenario 1. We note that 62 years of negative indexation at 3%
p.a would lead to an 84% decrease in the size of the pension.
Thus, we see that the measures to restore the sustainability of the Chinese pension sys-
tem when taking in isolation are quite severe. Therefore, a more gentle combination
involving the contribution rate, retirement age and indexation of pensions simultane-
ously might be more applicable and not so harsh towards the participants in the system.
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Figure 5.4: Optimal paths of key decision variables to restore the sustainability of the
Chinese PAYG pension system, with only one modified variable, 2012-2087
(a) Contribution rate, ct
(b) Retirement age, x(r)t
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(c) Indexation of pensions, λt
Own source
ABM with the Three Decision Variables Modified Simultaneously
Under population structure in Scenario 1, as shown in Figure 5.5, the contribution rate
stabilizes at 26.24% whereas the age of retirement and indexation of pension reach the
values 57.54 and 3% respectively at the end of the time horizon.
Even in the case of Scenario 3, the variables still need to be modified to guarantee the
financial sustainability of the Chinese pension system in the long run. In this case,
the contribution rate and retirement age would need to increase to 23.20% and 55.45
respectively, while the indexation of pension decreases to 3.70%.
As shown in Figure 5.5d, the value of the buffer fund always remains positive due to
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the liquidity constraint imposed in our minimization problem, i.e. the system always
need to have enough money to cover the expenditure on pensions on an annual basis.
In the case of the adjusted one-child policy (Scenario 2), the value of the fund increases
rapidly towards the end of the projection period as this policy does not have an imme-
diate impact while the decision variables are modified from the beginning of the time
horizon44.
Figure 5.5: Optimal paths of key decision variables to restore the sustainability of the
Chinese PAYG pension system, with three variables modified simultaneously, 2012-
2087
(a) Contribution rate, ct
44This is due to the asymmetric design of the mechanism where changes in the decision variables
only happen to face adverse demographic and economic risks, i.e. any surplus that might arise at some
point is maintained in the system.
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(b) Retirement age, x(r)t
(c) Indexation of pensions, λt
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(d) Buffer fund, Ft
Own source
Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection provides the sensitivity analysis for the value of the return of the buffer
fund and the replacement rate (RR) respectively.
Different levels of return of the buffer fund. Chinese central government has ap-
proved the regulation to invest up to 30% of its pension fund into the domestic stock
market on August 17th 2015. Previously pension fund was invested in the bank de-
posits and treasury bonds with a very low yield around 3%, which was lower than the
inflation rate, i.e. pension fund is depreciating. This subsection analyses two levels
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of return higher than the value of the baseline scenario, i.e. 3%. As shown in Ta-
ble 5.1, even in the case of a rate of return of 8%, the contribution rate and retirement
age would need to increase to values in the range of 22.62%-26.18% and 54.86-57.34
respectively, depending on the demographic scenarios, whereas the indexation of pen-
sions would reach a value around 3% at the end of the period.
Table 5.1: ABM when the three variables are modified simultaneously under different
values of the return of the buffer fund
ct x
(r)
t λt
S1(One-child policy), Jt = 5% 26.20% 57.54 3.00%
S2(Adjusted one-child policy), Jt = 5% 24.08% 56.49 3.02%
S3(No fertility policy), Jt = 5% 24.08% 54.93 3.04%
S1(One-child policy), Jt = 8% 26.18% 57.34 3.01%
S2(Adjusted one-child policy), Jt = 8% 23.89% 56.38 3.03%
S3(No fertility policy), Jt = 8% 22.62% 54.86 3.14%
Own source
Different levels of the replacement rate. This subsection analyses the optimal paths
of the decision variables after the initial pension is set at 50% of the average salary in-
stead of 61% as in our baseline scenario. As shown in Table 5.2, the decision variables
also need to be adjusted in order to guarantee the sustainability of the system over the
next 75 years.
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show that more optimistic assumptions regarding the levels of
the buffer fund and replacement rate do not guarantee the long-term sustainability of
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Table 5.2: ABM when three variables are modified simultaneously under different
values of the RR.
ct x
(r)
t λt
S1(One-child policy), RR = 50% 24.20% 56.56 3.17%
S2(Adjusted one-child policy), RR = 50% 24.05% 54.51 3.33%
S3(No fertility policy), RR = 50% 23.80% 54.17 3.42%
Own source
the Chinese pension system under any of the three demographic scenarios considered.
5.5 Summary
This chapter builds population projections in China under different fertility policies
over the next 75 years and evaluates their implications for the long-term sustainability
of the pension system. Even if the one-child policy had never been conducted, the
old-age dependency ratio in 2087 would be 81.01%, i.e. one pensioner financed by 1.2
contributors. In the case of one-child policy implemented in 1979 and keeps in place
until 2087, the old-age dependency ratio would be 124.94% at the end of the period
analysed, i.e. there will be more pensioners than the contributors in the Chinese PAYG
pension system.
Following Godı´nez-Olivares et al. (2016a), we propose a combination of different re-
forms (automatic balancing mechanism) involving the contribution rate, retirement age
and indexation of pension that restores not only the sustainability but also the liquidity
of the system. In order to restore the sustainability of the system, in the case of only
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one decision variable is modified, the contribution rate and the effective retirement age
would need to increase to values in the range of 42.53%-59.36% and 63.72-67.89 re-
spectively, whereas the indexation of pension would need to decrease to value in the
range of -3% to 0%. If the three decision variables are modified simultaneously, the
contribution rate and the effective retirement age would need to increase to values in
the range of 23.20%-26.64% and 55.45-57.54 respectively, whereas the indexation of
pension would need to decrease to value in the range of 3%-3.7%, depending on the
different fertility policies.
This chapter shows that the sustainability of the Chinese pension system is not guar-
anteed under any of the different demographic scenarios analysed, and the one-child
policy is harmful to the long-term sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
Future research is focused on analysing the impact of rural to urban migration on
the demographic structures, since the net migration rates provided by United Nations
(2015) only takes into account the international migration. With this aim in mind, we
adjusting the net migration rates from United Nations (2015) by a rural to urban mi-
gration rate, and calculate the optimal paths of the contribution rate, retirement age
and indexation of pension based on the ABM for China. As Dyson (2011) has stated
that the deep reason behind urbanization process is the demographic transition, and
the continuous rural to urban migration will influence the demographic structure in the
urban area. Thus, analysis of the rural to urban migration also shows the implications
of urbanization process on the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system in
urban areas.
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Chapter 6
Implications of Urbanization Process
The urbanization rate in China has expanded from 12% to 50% in 6 decades between
1950 and 2011, while the same transition took 150 years to occur in Europe and 210
years in Latin America and the Caribbean. The key reason behind the fast urbanization
in China is the change of demographic structures due to the rural to urban migration.
The demographic change will have an enormous impact on the PAYG pension system
which operates in the way that current contributors pays pensions to current pensioners.
This chapter analyses the impact of urbanization on the long-term sustainability of the
Chinese PAYG pension system. The result shows that contrary to the current public hy-
pothesis that huge inflow of the working-age population will restore the demographic
balance between contributors and pensioners, the rapid urbanization process will result
in a higher old-age dependency ratio after 2050. Overall, by analysing the sustainabil-
ity of Chinese pension system over the next 75 years, the result shows that urbanization
133
leads to a less sustainable pension system in China.
6.1 Introduction
An urbanization process is a shift of part of a population from rural settlements, where
agriculture is the dominant economic activity, to urban settlements, characterized by
industrial and service activities (Montgomery et al., 2004). Urbanization is a global
trend. According to United Nations (2014), over half of the world’s population (54%)
is currently living in urban areas, while the urbanization rate45 was only 30% in 1950.
United Nations (2014) projects the urbanization rate to be 66% by 2050. The global
trend of urbanization is linked to sustainable development. In terms of advantages, a
greater concentration of people in urban areas can facilitate economic and social devel-
opment because, as noted by Gru¨bler and Fisk (2013), nearly 80% of the global gross
domestic product (GDP) is generated in cities. Urbanization also improves the living
standards for society as a whole, and Cohen (2006) has found that governments can
take advantage of the economies of scale that cities provide to supply an infrastructure
(such as roads and electricity) and basic services (such as education and healthcare) to
a large population at a much lower cost than would be required to reach the same num-
ber of people dispersed in rural areas. However, rapid and unplanned urban growth also
has disadvantages. Urban inequalities emerge with the growth of urbanization (Fink
et al., 2014), and the urban poor face greater exposure to pollution and health risks
45The urbanization rate is defined as the number of the population living in the urban area divided by
the total population, and is expressed as a percentage (United Nations, 2014).
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(Balk et al., 2009). Furthermore, unplanned urban expansion leads to environmental
degradation, because land areas now occupy green areas. Angel et al. (2011b) stated
that today’s cities are growing twice as fast in terms of land area as they are in terms
of population. Furthermore, Angel et al. (2011a) and Seto et al. (2012) have fore-
casted that the global urban land area will triple in size by 2030. To respond to these
challenges and opportunities, the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development highlighted the need for sustainable cities as a matter of great urgency
in the United Nations development agenda. At the same time, the 3rd United Nations
Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) will bring
world leaders together to improve sustainability in an urbanizing world.
China, as the country with the largest population in the world, is projected to have the
largest decline in the rural population by 2050, according to United Nations (2014).
The speed of urbanization in China is much faster than the world average level, with
the urbanization rate having grown from 12% in 1950 to 56% in 2015, and is pro-
jected to be 76% by 2050 (United Nations, 2014) (See Figure 6.1 for the urbanization
rate for China and World). In 2011, China’s urbanization rate surpassed 50%, which
meant this was the first time in China’s long history that more citizens were living in
cities than in rural areas. The urbanization process in China has drawn much atten-
tion, both because of its speed and scale. It took 6 decades for the urbanization rate in
China to expand from 10% to 50%, while the same transition took 150 years to occur
in Europe and 210 years in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2011, the number
of internal migrants reached 260 million in China, with a further 310 million people
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expected to migrate from rural to urban areas during the next two decades (Pan et al.,
2013). Such rapid urbanization in terms of speed and scale is unprecedented in human
history. Since 1995, rural migrants have become the main source of urban population
expansion, comprising 31.2% of urban residents in 2010. The demographic profile
of internal migrants will have an enormous impact on demands for employment and
social services in China (Cai and Wang, 2012).
Dyson (2011) has claimed that the fundamental reason behind the urbanization process
is the demographic transition, and that the continuous rural to urban migration will
influence the demographic structure in the urban area. Furthermore, the demographic
change will have a major impact on the sustainability of a PAYG pension system, in
which current active workers pay the benefits for current pensioners. This chapter
aims to fill a gap in the literature by investigating the consequences of the urbanization
process for the PAYG pension system in terms of long-term sustainability. With this
aim in mind, we analyse how rural to urban migration will influence the urban PAYG
pension system in China.
Following this introduction, in Section 6.2, we define and generate a rural to urban mi-
gration rate, and incorporate it into the cohort component method by adjusting the net
migration rates in the population projections. In Section 6.3, we calculate the optimal
paths for the contribution rate, retirement age, and indexation of pensions in the Chi-
nese pension system by considering the impact of the urbanization process. Finally,
Section 6.4 provides a summary.
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Figure 6.1: Urbanization rate for China and World, 1950-2050
Own source based on United Nations (2014)
6.2 Population Projections for Urbanization Process
In this section, we use the cohort component method described in Section 5.3.1 to cal-
culate the population pyramids in China by adding the rural to urban migrants into the
net migrants. The results with the rural to urban migration will be compared with the
baseline scenario (Scenario 2 in Chapter 5, which is the scenario showing the current
situation in China) in order to see the implications of the urbanization process.
6.2.1 Rural to Urban Migration Rate
The rural to urban migration rate is defined as the increasing rate of the urbanization
rate. The formula to calculate the rural to urban migration rate, mr(t), is as follows:
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mr(t) =
U(t)− U(t− 1)
U(t− 1) (6.1)
whereU(t) is the urbanization rate at year t. The rural to urban migration rate measures
the proportion of the rural to urban migrants accounts for the total number of the urban
population at year t.
6.2.2 Main Data and Scenario Analysed
• Baseline scenario: Scenario 2 in Chapter 5 (which is the scenario showing the
current situation in China with fertility rate equal to 246) is provided as the base-
line scenario in order for the comparison with the migration scenario.
• Migration scenario: The survival rates and fertility rates under the migration
scenario are the same as the baseline scenario, while the net migration rates47
are adjusted by the rural to urban migration rates during the calculation of the
population projections in the urban area.
• The urbanization rates, U(t), which are used to generate the rural to urban mi-
gration rates, is from United Nations (2014). Since United Nations (2014) only
46According to the latest regulation in China (The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social
Development of the People ł Republic of China, i.e. the 13th Five-Year Plan) now every family can
have two children.
47The net migration rates from United Nations (2015) have not taken into account the rural to urban
migration.
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provides the urbanization rates until 2050, it is assumed that the rural to urban
migration rates, mr(t), remain constant from 2050 to 208748. Figure 6.2 shows
the rural to urban migration rates of China over the period 2012-2087.
• The age distribution of the rural to urban migrants are from the 6th population
census (Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National Bureau
of Statistics of China, 2010).
Figure 6.2: Rural to urban migration rate for China, 2012-2087
Own source
48The urbanization rate will be 88.94% in 2087, if the rural to urban migration rates keep constant
from 2050 to 2087.
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6.2.3 Results
From Figure 6.3, we can see, the old-age dependency ratios under migration scenario
are lower than the baseline scenario from 2012 to 2050. It is because the rural to urban
migrants are young of age, the average age of the migrants are 34.75 according to the
6th population census (Department of Population and Employment Statistics, National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2010). The huge inflow of the working-age population
leads to a low dependency ratio at the beginning. However, as the urbanization rates
approach 100%, the number of rural to urban migrants will decrease in the future. At
the same time, the early huge inflow of the migrants is starting to retire. It therefore
results in a higher old-age dependency ratio after 2050. Figure 6.4 shows the popula-
tion pyramids in urban areas under the migration scenario and the baseline scenario in
2012, 2050 and 2087. We can see the number of old-age population is increasing more
rapidly under migration scenario, compared to the baseline scenario.
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Figure 6.3: Old-age dependency ratios (aged 53+/aged 16-52) for urbanization process,
2012-2087
Own source
Note: Male to female sex ratio of rural to urban migrants has been taken into account,
the ratio is 2.30 male per female according to 6th population census in China.
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Figure 6.4: Evolution of population pyramids in urban areas under migration and base-
line scenarios
(a) Baseline scenario
(b) Migration scenario
Own source
6.3 ABM to Restore the Sustainability
This section provides the results of ABM under migration scenario and baseline sce-
nario following the methodology in Section 5.4. First, the results with only one deci-
sion variable modified are provided. Second, the results with three decision variables
modified simultaneously are shown. We also carried out a sensitivity analysis for the
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different values of rural to urban migration rates from 2050 to 2087.
6.3.1 Mechanism
The methodology used here is the same as in Section 5.4.1. That is, the mechanism
identifies the optimal paths of the three key decision variables (contribution rate, ct ,
retirement age, x(r)t , and indexation of pensions, λt ) while minimizing the net present
value of the buffer fund, Ft , subject to some constraints.
The buffer fund is calculated as:
Ft = (1 + Jt)Ft−1 + ctWt(gt, x
(r)
t )− Et(gt, x(r)t , λt) (6.2)
The liquidity constraint is set as Ft ≥ 0, for all t, i.e. no deficit is allowed in the
Chinese pension system.
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The ABM is defined as the following optimization problem:
min
ct,x
(r)
t ,λt
T∑
t=0
Ft(ct, gt, x
(r)
t , λt, Jt)
(1 + δ)t
s.t. =

cmin ≤ ct ≤ cmax;
x
(r)
min ≤ x(r)t ≤ x(r)max;
λmin ≤ λt ≤ λmax;
c1M ≤ ct+1ct ≤ c2M;
x
(r)
1M ≤ x
(r)
t+1
x
(r)
t
≤ x(r)2M ;
λ1M ≤ λt+1λt ≤ λ2M;
Ft ≥ 0.
(6.3)
6.3.2 Data and Assumptions
The data and assumptions under migration scenario are the same as the baseline sce-
nario (Scenario 2 in Chapter 5) in order for the easy comparison between the two
scenarios.
• Data on the number of participants in the Chinese contributory PAYG pension
system in urban areas is obtained from Human Resources and Social Security
Statistics Bulletin 2012.
• Data on the average salary in 2012 is equal to 47,593 RMB/year. The infor-
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mation on wage distribution by age group is taken from the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China. Annual real
wage growth rate, gt , is equal to 7.62%. The initial contribution rate, ct, is 20%.
• The average monthly pension is equal to 1,721 RMB/month (20,652 RMB/year).
The initial pension is equal to 61% of the average salary in the Chinese PAYG
pension system, i.e. the replacement rate is equal to 61%. The initial revaluation
of pension in payments, λt , is equal to 9.13%. The initial effective retirement
age in China is 53.
• Data on the initial amount of buffer fund is from National Social Security Fund
Report 2012. The growth rate of the pension fund, Jt, is assumed to be 3%. The
discount rate, δ, is also equal to 3%.
• The lower bounds of the contribution rate, retirement age, and indexation of
pensions are equal to 20%, 53, and -10% respectively, whereas the upper bounds
are set respectively as 65%, 70, and 10%, in the case of only one decision vari-
ables is modified. While three variables are modified simultaneously, the lower
bounds are given by 20%, 53, and 0% respectively, and upper bounds are 30%,
60, and 10% respectively.
• The maximum increase for contribution rate and retirement age in each year is
assumed to be 2.5% and 6 months, whereas the minimum decrease for pension
in payment is set to be -1%, in the case of only one decision variable is modified.
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The constraints are assumed to be 2.5%, 3 months and -0.5% respectively when
three variables are modified simultaneously.
6.3.3 Results
ABM with Only One Modified Decision Variable
Figure 6.5a shows that when the contribution rate is the only decision variable, it would
need to increase to 57.56% in 2087 under migration scenario, which is 3.01% higher
than the baseline scenario. The retirement age needs to increase to 67.44 as shown in
Figure 6.5b, whereas its value would stable at 65.95 under the baseline scenario. If the
indexation of pensions is the only decision variable, as shown in Figure 6.5c, its value
would need to decrease at an annual rate of 2.22% under migration scenario, whereas
its value needs to decrease at 1.8% annually under the baseline scenario.
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Figure 6.5: ABM for urbanization process when one variable is modified, 2012-2087
(a) Contribution Rate, ct
(b) Retirement age, x(r)t
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(c) Indexation of Pensions, λt
ABM with Three Decision Variables Modified Simultaneously
As shown in Figure 6.6, in the case of migration scenario, the contribution rate and re-
tirement age would need to increase to 25.10% and 57.4 respectively, while the index-
ation of pensions needs to decrease to 3.05%. Whereas the values of the contribution
rate, retirement age and indexation of pension are 24.28%, 57.17 and 3.17% respec-
tively under the baseline scenario. Figure 6.6d shows that liquidity constraints are
imposed in our minimization problem, since the system need to have enough money to
cover the expenditure on pensions on an annual basis.
From Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6, we can see, the urbanization process worsens the long-
term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system.
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Figure 6.6: ABM for urbanization process when three decision variables are modified
simultaneously, 2012-2087
(a) Contribution Rate, ct
(b) Retirement age, x(r)t
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(c) Indexation of Pensions, λt
(d) Buffer Fund, Ft
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Sensitivity Analysis
This subsection provides a sensitivity analysis for the different values of the rural to
urban migration rate from 2050 to 2087. Table 6.1 shows that the value of the contribu-
tion rate and retirement age under migration scenario is in the range of 24.79%-26.14%
and 57.34-57.52 respectively, which is always higher than the baseline scenario with
the value of 24.28% and 57.17 respectively. Whereas the indexation of pensions is
in the range of 3.02%-3.10%, which always lower than the baseline scenario with the
value of 3.17%. As a result, the values under all the migration scenarios are worse than
the baseline scenario. It means urbanization process worsens the sustainability of the
Chinese pension system, regardless of the assumptions for the different values of the
rural to urban migration rates.
Table 6.1: ABM when the three variables are modified simultaneously under different
values of the rural to urban migration rate from 2050 to 2087
ct xt λt
Baseline Scenario 24.28% 57.17 3.17%
Migration Scenario, mr(t) = 0% 26.14% 57.52 3.02%
Migration Scenario, mr(t) = 1% 26.02% 57.41 3.03%
Migration Scenario, mr(t) = 3% 24.79% 57.34 3.10%
Own source
Note: When mr(t) is greater than 3%, the urbanization rate will exceed 100% in
2087.
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6.4 Summary
This chapter analyses the implications of the urbanization process on the long-term
sustainability of the pension system by introducing a rural to urban migration rate and
applying it to the cohort component method. The result of the population projections
shows that the old-age dependency ratio under migration scenario is lower than the
baseline scenario at the beginning of the period from 2012 to 2049, but becomes higher
than the baseline scenario from 2050 to 2087.
In order to restore the sustainability of the Chinese pension system, in the case of only
one decision variable is modified, the contribution rate and the effective retirement age
would need to increase by 3.01% and 18 months respectively, whereas the indexation
of pensions needs to decrease by 0.42% under migration scenario, compared to the
baseline scenario. If three decision variables are modified simultaneously, the contri-
bution rate and the effective retirement age would need to increase by 0.82% and 3
months respectively, whereas the indexation of pensions would need to decrease by
0.12% under migration scenario, compared to the baseline scenario.
This chapter shows that the demographic change due to the rural to urban migration
will have an enormous impact on the Chinese PAYG pension system in the urban area.
Contrary to the current public hypothesis that the huge inflow of the working-age pop-
ulation will restore the demographic balance between the contributors and pensioners,
the rapid urbanization process will result in a demographic structure with more pen-
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sioners than contributors at the end of the period analysed, and at the same time lead
to a higher old-age dependency ratio after 2050. Thus, the urbanization process is not
helpful to solve the ageing problem in China. As a result, the urbanization process
worsens the long-term sustainability of the Chinese pension system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This study analysed the long-term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system
in urban areas, as well as the factors influencing the sustainability of the pension system
in China.
This work was motivated by the decline in fertility rates and the increase in longevity
in China, which has resulted in a serious ageing problem. At the same time, the re-
cent demographic change has led to an enormous increase in the old-age dependency
ratio. Since the PAYG pension system requires a balance between the benefits paid
to pensioners and the contribution made by active works, the financial health of the
Chinese PAYG pension system and the method to restore the financial equilibrium to
this pension system have become hot topics in academic literature. However, current
literature lacks analysis on the long-term sustainability of the pension system. Studies
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that analyse the current political and social situation in China, including the one-child
policy and the urbanization process, are also restricted in the area of economic growth.
This study fills this gap.
Chapter 2 explains some basic concepts in a pension system at first, and then give ex-
amples for the pension systems around the world. The vast majority of the countries
around the world chose the PAYG scheme at the beginning of their public pension
systems and keeps this form till now. Since PAYG system could finance the pension
payments immediately after the establishment of the system. The design and reforms
of the pension system should follow two objectives – adequacy and sustainability. Fur-
thermore, the current context of rapid global ageing has led to serous concerns of the
financial sustainability in the PAYG pension system. A lot of countries has already
taken the pension reforms with the objective to achieve an sustainable pension system
at the same delivering the adequacy among the participants.
After that, Chapter 3 focuses on the pension systems in China. It reviews the evolution
of the entire public pension system in China based on three time periods. The first
period is from 1951 to 1986, when the preliminary system has been established after
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. The system only exited within each
enterprise in urban areas. The second period is from 1986 to 1997, the individual ac-
counts has been introduced during this period in order to increase the labour mobility
in the competition between SOEs and private enterprises in 1980s. The final stage is
from 1997 till now, when the current standardized system has been gradually devel-
oped. Current Chinese pension system faces a lot of challenges. The rapid ageing and
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urbanization together with the expansion of higher education and loss of trust among
participants have raise serious concerns in the pension system. To solve these prob-
lems, pension reforms are needed urgently. Discussions of future directions of pension
reforms in this chapter cover not only the financial sustainabilities but also the pension
adequacy in China.
Chapter 4 analyses the Chinese PAYG pension system in urban areas for the period
2007-2012 using two actuarial balance methodologies. The first methodology is the
Swedish solvency ratio, based on verifiable facts. The second methodology is the
United States’ actuarial balance indicator, which takes into account projected demo-
graphic and economic structures over the next 75 years. This is the first estimate of
sustainability level of the Chinese PAYG pension system. Both methodologies show
that the Chinese pension system, in its current form, is unsustainable. The results show
that the values of liabilities are more than double that of assets in the case of Swedish
methodology. Furthermore, the contribution rate would need to increase by 39.09%
immediately to obtain a sustainable Chinese PAYG pension system for the next 75
years, based on the United States’ methodology. Some advice on the parametric re-
forms to restore the financial health of the system is also provided in this chapter.
Since the results in Chapter 4 show the unsustainability of the current Chinese PAYG
pension system, it is interesting to analyse the factors that influence the financial equi-
librium in China. Chapter 5 analyses the implications of the one-child policy on the
long-term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system. In 1979, the Chinese
government introduced the one-child policy with the aim of controlling the country’s
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rapid population growth. This policy will lead to deficits in the Chinese PAYG pen-
sion system since the country’s individuals are living longer and having fewer chil-
dren. Three demographic structures for different fertility policies (‘One-child policy
is implemented as in 1979’, ‘One-child policy is relaxed as in 2013’, and ‘No fertility
policy implemented since 1979’) are calculated using the cohort component method.
The ABM to restore the sustainability of the pension system over the next 75 years is
provided for each demographic structure.
The main finding in Chapter 5 is that, the one-child policy is harmful to the sustain-
ability, and all the scenarios studied indicate an urgent need to introduce mechanisms
to guarantee the long-term sustainability of the Chinese pension system. In order to
restore the sustainability of the system, if the three decision variables are modified
simultaneously, the contribution rate and the effective retirement age would need to
increase to 23.20%-26.64% and 55.45-57.54, respectively, whereas the indexation of
pensions would need to decrease to 3%-3.7%, depending on the different fertility poli-
cies.
Chapter 6 analyses the implications of urbanization process on the long-term sustain-
ability of the Chinese PAYG pension system. The urbanization rate in China has
expanded from 12% to 50% in 6 decades between 1950 and 2011, while the same
transition took 150 years to occur in Europe and 210 years in Latin America and the
Caribbean. The key reason behind the fast urbanization in China is the change of de-
mographic structure due to the rural to urban migration. The huge inflow of the rural
to urban migrants will have an impact on the PAYG pension system which operates
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in the way that current contributors pays pensions to current pensioners. This chapter
analyses the impact of urbanization on the long-term sustainability of Chinese PAYG
pension system by adjusting the net migration rates using the rural to urban migration
rates.
The results in Chapter 6 show that demographic changes due to rural to urban mi-
gration will have an enormous impact on the PAYG pension system. Contrary to the
current public hypothesis that a huge inflow of the working-age population will restore
the demographic balance between contributors and pensioners, the rapid urbanization
process will result in a higher old-age dependency ratio after 2050. In order to restore
the sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system over the next 75 years, the
effect of urbanization process would increase the contribution rate and the effective
retirement age by 0.82% and 3 months respectively, as well as decrease the indexation
of pensions by 0.12%, as compared with the scenario without rural to urban migration.
As a result, the urbanization process will worsen the long-term sustainability of the
Chinese PAYG pension system.
Overall, the Chinese PAYG pension system is unsustainable in its current form, at the
same time, the one-child policy and the urbanization process make the sustainability of
the pension system even worse. The mechanisms to restore the financial equilibrium
of the system should be undertaken immediately in order to guarantee the long-term
sustainability of this pension system.
There are also limitations with the study of this thesis. Data on the contributors and
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pensioners per age is currently not available in China, due to the lack of data collec-
tion system. This study has solved this problem, by assuming the age distribution of
contributors as the distribution of urban employed workers, and the age distribution
of pensioners as the distribution of urban elder people. However, the study could be
improved by having the direct access to the age distribution of contributors and pen-
sioners. Since this is a common problem in the research of the Chinese pension system,
the Chinese government has realised it and tried to solve it by setting up a standard-
ised electronic management system, such as ‘Golden Insurance Project’, to collect the
pension data in the country’s level recently.
Future research could focus on two directions:
1. To analyse the other political or social events in China, which affect the long-
term sustainability of the Chinese PAYG pension system.
2. To analyse the factors that influence the individuals’ retirement behaviours.
To give an example, the analysis on the first direction could focus on the impact of
recent central government’s approval, which allowed the pension fund to be invested
in the stock market.
Chinese central government has approved the regulation to invest up to 30% of its
pension fund into the domestic stock market on August 17th 2015, due to the grow-
ing ageing problem and recently biggest crash in the stock market. Previously pension
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fund was invested in the bank deposits and treasury bonds with a very low yield around
3%, which was lower than the inflation rate, i.e. pension fund is depreciating. This reg-
ulation has raised serious concerns for the Chinese pension system, since the pension
fund now is facing a lot of higher risks than before.
After the new regulation, Chinese pension fund can be invested into two general cat-
egories. One is lower risk assets, such as bank deposits, treasury bonds and so on,
the interest rates of which are similar with the bank deposit rate. The other kind of
investment is higher risk assets, such as domestic stocks, stock indexes, the proportion
of this kind of investment cannot exceed 30% of the total assets.
By analysing the different scenarios for the return of the buffer fund based on the ABM
to restore the sustainability of the Chinese pension system over the next 75 years, we
can compare the differences in the optimal paths of the three key decision variables (the
contribution rate, retirement age and indexation of pensions). It thus will provide us
with a clear view of the consequences of this regulation on the long-term sustainability
of the Chinese pension system.
The motivation of the study on the second direction is that, the world main trend of
pension system reforms is transferring from DB to DC. As stated in Oksanen (2010),
Dorfman et al. (2013), and Zheng (2014), China is also considering transferring its pen-
sion scheme to NDC. This transformation shifts a lot of pressure for financial decisions
about financing retirement from governments to individuals. Therefore, whether indi-
viduals can make the right retirement decision will directly influence the sustainability
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of a pension system. At the same time, researchers have started to study the causal
effects of financial literacy on individuals’ retirement decisions. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2009, 2011) stated that, those with more advanced financial knowledge are those more
likely to be retirement-ready, and financial literacy is critical to retirement security
around the world. However, there is no literature has directly review the causal effects
of financial literacy and retirement decision in China. This study is going to analyse
whether financial literacy influences individuals’ retirement decisions in China, and
also evaluate its impact. Instead of asking ‘whether the individual has ever planned
for his/her retirement’ in a questionnaire as the previous literature, I’m going to use
individuals’ real retirement decisions at different time periods as a dummy variable in
a regression model.
Though the focus of this study remains on China, it is expected that the findings are
relevant for other countries who are also intended to change the pension system from
DB to DC, and in which individual choices may influence retirement arrangements.
This study can be interesting for the policy makers in the issues of whether education
of financial literacy should be improved in China to make individuals’ to be better
prepared for their retirement.
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Appendix A
Share of Elderly People in the World
Figure A.1: Share of elderly people in the percentage of total population in the world
(%).
Own source based on United Nations (2015)
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The share of elderly people in the percentage of total population in the world has been
growing rapidly. Figure A.1 shows the proportion of elderly people aged above 60,
65, 70, and 75 respectively. We can see that, the share of people aged above 60 has
increased from 8% in 1950 to 12.3% in 2015, and it is going to be 25.9% by 2080. At
the same time, the share of people aged 75 and above has grown from 1.4% in 1950 to
3.3% in 2015, and is projected to reach 10.7% in 2080.
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Appendix B
Public Expenditure on Pensions
around the World
Table B.1 shows that 22 out of 35 OECD countries will face increases in their public
expenditure on pensions in future, based on the projections from OECD (2015). The
overall pension expenditures around the OECD countries will grow up from current
9% of the total GDP to 10.1% in 2050. The expenditures will increase in vast majority
of the major economies in the world. In China, it will increase from current 3.4% of
the GDP to 9.2% in 2050.
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Table B.1: Public expenditure on pensions in percentage of GDP (%), 2010-2050
2010-2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Change
OECD members
Australia 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 -0.3
Austria 13.9 13.9 14.1 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.6 0.7
Belgium 11.8 12.7 13.8 14.7 15.2 15.2 15.1 15.0 3.2
Canada 4.9 6.3 1.4
Chile 5.5 3.8 -1.7
Czech Republic 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.6 0.6
Denmark 10.3 8.7 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.7 7.5 -2.8
Estonia 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.7 -0.9
Finland 12.9 14.2 14.9 15.0 14.4 13.6 13.0 12.8 -0.1
France 14.9 14.6 14.9 14.7 14.2 13.8 13.3 12.8 -2.1
Germany 10.0 10.3 10.9 11.6 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.5 2.5
Greece 16.2 15.5 15.0 14.4 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.4 -1.8
Hungary 11.5 9.8 9.3 8.9 9.1 9.6 10.4 10.7 -0.9
Iceland 3.3 3.5 0.2
Ireland 7.4 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.6 10.0 10.2 10.0 2.6
Israel 0.0
Italy 15.7 15.3 15.5 15.7 15.8 15.8 15.5 14.8 -0.9
Japan 11.2 10.5 9.9 -11.2
Korea 1.7 12.5 10.8
Luxembourg 9.4 10.6 11.2 11.9 12.4 12.7 12.7 12.5 3.1
Mexico 1.5 1.3 -0.2
Netherlands 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.1 1.2
New Zealand 5.5 7.3 1.8
Norway 9.9 10.7 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.6 1.7
Poland 11.3 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 -0.9
Portugal 13.8 14.6 14.9 15.0 15.0 14.8 14.6 14.4 0.6
Slovak Republic 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.6 9.1 1.0
Slovenia 11.8 11.1 11.4 12.3 13.3 14.3 15.1 15.6 3.8
Spain 11.8 11.8 11.4 11.2 11.5 11.9 12.5 12.3 0.5
Sweden 8.9 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.2 -1.7
Switzerland 9.6 10.7 1.1
Turkey 6.3 17.0 10.7
United Kingdom 7.7 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.1 8.1 0.5
United States 4.9 6.1 1.2
OECD 9.0 10.1 1.1
Other major economies
Argentina 7.4 11.9 4.5
Brazil 9.1 16.8 7.7
China 3.4 9.2 5.8
India 1.0 0.7 -0.3
Indonesia 0.7 1.6 0.9
Russian Federation 8.1 14.9 6.8
Saudi Arabia 2.2 8.1 5.9
South Africa 1.9 3.5 1.6
EU28 11.3 11.2 11.4 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.4 0.1
Own source based on OECD (2015)
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Appendix C
Social Security System in China
Figure C.1: Structure of social security system in China
Own source
The entire social security system in China consists of five parts, which are pension sys-
tem, medical insurance system, unemployment insurance system, maternity insurance
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system and disability insurance system, as shown in Figure C.1.
Pension system in China, or also known as old-age social insurance system, is or-
ganized and operated by the state based on some regulations to provide the income for
old-age population after their retirement. The aim of the pension system is to protect
elderly people from poverty and to provide adequate income for them after retirement.
Medical insurance system is regulated by the state laws in China, and all the urban
workers are mandatory to participate in the system. The contribution is from employ-
ers and employees together. The aim of the medical insurance is to share the financial
burden with the individuals for the cost of medical care.
Unemployment insurance system is also regulated by the state laws and mandatory
to all the urban workers in China. The contribution to this system is from employers
and employees together during the employment. The aim of the system is to provide
temporary income for the individuals who lose their jobs.
Maternity insurance system is designed for the female works who are pregnant dur-
ing their employment. It is guaranteed by the state laws in China, and all the female
workers are supposed to participant in this system. The contribution to system is solely
from employers. The system provides the income for the female workers and pays out
the cost for the medical care during their maternity.
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Disability insurance system in China is regulated by the state laws, and is designed
to protect all the workers from damages caused by their work, which could lead to
their disability or death. The contribution to this system is solely from the employers.
It aims to provide the income compensations to the disabled workers or to their fami-
lies.
The five parts of the social security system in China is operated separately, and the
fund in each one is managed independently from others.
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Appendix D
Average Weighted Ages for Pensions
and Contributors
According to Boado-Penas et al. (2008) and Settergren and Mikula (2005), the for-
mulae to calculate the average weighted age for the pensioners, Art , and the average
weighted age for the contributors, Act , is shown as below:
Art =
∑w−1−xe−A
k=0 (xe + A+ k)P(xe+A+k,t)N(xe+A+k,t)∑w−1−xe−A
k=0 P(xe+A+k,t)N(xe+A+k,t)
(D.1)
Act =
∑A−1
k=0 (xe + k)y(xe+k,t)N(xe+k,t)∑A−1
k=0 y(xe+k,t)N(xe+k,t)
(D.2)
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Appendix E
Mortality Table for China
Table E.1 shows the mortality tables for China during the period 2007-2012, sources
are from China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook (Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012a).
Table E.1: Mortality Table for China
Age 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
0 0.009382 0.013641 0.007098 0.003816 0.010435 0.003430
1 0.001504 0.002027 0.001390 0.001113 0.000809 0.001070
2 0.000720 0.001152 0.000590 0.000627 0.000351 0.000630
3 0.000543 0.001066 0.000908 0.000452 0.000361 0.000620
4 0.000781 0.000708 0.000415 0.000370 0.000230 0.000500
5 0.000726 0.000424 0.000150 0.000333 0.000311 0.000100
6 0.000524 0.000314 0.000467 0.000318 0.000150 0.000200
7 0.000049 0.000223 0.000310 0.000285 0.000471 0.000170
8 0.000387 0.000215 0.000133 0.000283 0.000645 0.000270
9 0.000579 0.000366 0.000522 0.000282 0.000580 0.000260
10 0.000316 0.000326 0.000498 0.000305 0.000100 0.000000
11 0.000065 0.000531 0.000358 0.000293 0.000370 0.000200
12 0.000199 0.000369 0.000110 0.000301 0.000127 0.000310
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13 0.000234 0.000515 0.000210 0.000294 0.000398 0.000080
14 0.000411 0.000406 0.000297 0.000304 0.000347 0.000150
15 0.000243 0.000170 0.000255 0.000344 0.000322 0.000060
16 0.000391 0.000448 0.000211 0.000350 0.000450 0.000250
17 0.000215 0.000803 0.000189 0.000390 0.000234 0.000330
18 0.000426 0.000429 0.000435 0.000413 0.000395 0.000500
19 0.000515 0.000640 0.000441 0.000426 0.000484 0.000410
20 0.000392 0.000865 0.000391 0.000466 0.000296 0.000510
21 0.001194 0.000891 0.000880 0.000472 0.000524 0.000490
22 0.001192 0.000551 0.000766 0.000497 0.000594 0.000320
23 0.001019 0.000804 0.000406 0.000537 0.000356 0.000330
24 0.000865 0.000594 0.000253 0.000563 0.000234 0.000530
25 0.000454 0.000977 0.000796 0.000583 0.000363 0.000300
26 0.000918 0.000521 0.000972 0.000573 0.000585 0.000900
27 0.001226 0.001068 0.000345 0.000594 0.000403 0.000350
28 0.000733 0.001024 0.000474 0.000611 0.000400 0.000760
29 0.001223 0.000574 0.001439 0.000681 0.000633 0.001050
30 0.000997 0.001597 0.000672 0.000699 0.000761 0.000780
31 0.001153 0.001008 0.001379 0.000770 0.000766 0.000430
32 0.001083 0.001399 0.001104 0.000806 0.001263 0.000680
33 0.001312 0.001494 0.000868 0.000828 0.000594 0.001180
34 0.001003 0.001046 0.001039 0.000944 0.000870 0.001480
35 0.001162 0.001703 0.001112 0.001027 0.000818 0.001860
36 0.000870 0.001270 0.001023 0.001064 0.001195 0.000610
37 0.001202 0.001353 0.001010 0.001135 0.000888 0.001280
38 0.001605 0.000914 0.001248 0.001206 0.001787 0.001110
39 0.001595 0.001301 0.001464 0.001341 0.001691 0.001660
40 0.002008 0.001540 0.001526 0.001510 0.001508 0.001380
41 0.001933 0.002305 0.001580 0.001553 0.001199 0.001480
42 0.001925 0.001877 0.001689 0.001821 0.002470 0.001730
43 0.002655 0.001851 0.001527 0.001888 0.001555 0.002060
44 0.002464 0.002046 0.002168 0.002065 0.001799 0.001890
45 0.001429 0.001975 0.002385 0.002314 0.002582 0.002310
46 0.001913 0.002068 0.002262 0.002360 0.003264 0.002730
47 0.003955 0.002562 0.003632 0.002537 0.002478 0.002170
48 0.002998 0.003379 0.001546 0.003112 0.002394 0.002580
49 0.003881 0.003744 0.003078 0.003281 0.002869 0.003200
50 0.003814 0.003782 0.004020 0.003639 0.005304 0.004480
51 0.004285 0.003699 0.004207 0.003755 0.003688 0.003620
52 0.003597 0.004288 0.003394 0.003979 0.005034 0.005020
53 0.003411 0.004270 0.003998 0.004413 0.004586 0.005140
54 0.005189 0.003933 0.004739 0.004984 0.006283 0.005140
55 0.004093 0.005615 0.004454 0.005179 0.005025 0.005470
56 0.004766 0.005861 0.005625 0.005636 0.006813 0.006220
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57 0.006226 0.004716 0.005679 0.006094 0.005913 0.005580
58 0.007305 0.007203 0.005924 0.006807 0.006144 0.008150
59 0.007850 0.008332 0.006620 0.007666 0.006676 0.009020
60 0.006426 0.009514 0.007649 0.008542 0.008894 0.008800
61 0.006430 0.008500 0.006787 0.009377 0.009762 0.010920
62 0.010709 0.009701 0.008598 0.010382 0.009968 0.011440
63 0.010576 0.013414 0.012679 0.011121 0.010938 0.011830
64 0.012945 0.013065 0.009877 0.013011 0.012571 0.013130
65 0.015435 0.016016 0.013171 0.014211 0.015563 0.012010
66 0.014721 0.014724 0.016112 0.014737 0.017337 0.016570
67 0.015670 0.015327 0.014051 0.017229 0.019364 0.015150
68 0.024403 0.020020 0.017182 0.018644 0.018782 0.017650
69 0.023120 0.025351 0.017980 0.021914 0.020299 0.021680
70 0.026069 0.024899 0.023742 0.025568 0.021555 0.027200
71 0.029776 0.028286 0.022409 0.026728 0.023802 0.025670
72 0.033060 0.030809 0.023164 0.030942 0.031732 0.023760
73 0.030337 0.033404 0.031816 0.033591 0.029274 0.035650
74 0.031351 0.035411 0.032349 0.037445 0.033635 0.036440
75 0.044108 0.040308 0.039139 0.041511 0.035214 0.035930
76 0.046360 0.044637 0.038169 0.042191 0.048242 0.045610
77 0.042329 0.057323 0.046692 0.050969 0.059107 0.049840
78 0.055301 0.047889 0.052871 0.056201 0.049494 0.059950
79 0.059623 0.047896 0.049547 0.062121 0.061037 0.067640
80 0.057569 0.066543 0.057113 0.074281 0.070853 0.069310
81 0.075896 0.063838 0.068459 0.077907 0.065820 0.069610
82 0.072604 0.077971 0.067842 0.085809 0.082526 0.081050
83 0.079189 0.078372 0.091121 0.093518 0.101553 0.086150
84 0.073289 0.091975 0.073148 0.103631 0.088501 0.107900
85 0.089103 0.080704 0.076786 0.111000 0.105687 0.117330
86 0.111240 0.104517 0.092219 0.118879 0.111571 0.129940
87 0.094742 0.125280 0.105737 0.130066 0.126687 0.131620
88 0.130962 0.120150 0.120458 0.144177 0.135291 0.155130
89 0.101231 0.133787 0.121170 0.156873 0.120961 0.191340
90 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000
Source from China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook (Ministry of Hu-
man Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, 2012a)
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Appendix F
Calculation of Contribution Years
Table F.1 shows the different assumptions for the number of contribution years de-
pending on the entry age to the labour market and the number of non-contribution
years.
It is assumed that graduates of junior secondary school start working at the age of 16,
of senior secondary school at the age of 18, and of university and beyond at the age of
22. The information on ‘Educational attainment for urban employed persons by sex’,
‘The proportion of female employed persons in urban areas’, and ‘The proportion of
unemployed women for the reason of do housework in urban areas’, which are required
to calculate the total contribution years, are obtained from China Population and Em-
ployment Statistics Yearbook (Department of Population and Employment Statistics,
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013).
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Table F.1: Different assumptions for the number of contribution years
Baseline scenario More contribution years Fewer contribution years
16 10 7 15
22 3 2 5
Total Contribution Years, A 33 35 29
The formula to calculate the total number of contribution years, A, for an individual is
shown below:
A =βm
22∑
xe=16
[
(x(r)m − xe − A0)βem
]
+ βf
22∑
xe=16
[
(x
(r)
f − xe − A0)(1− β0f ) + (x0f − xe)β0f
]
βef
(F.1)
where βm is the proportion of male contributors in the number of total contributors,
while βf is the proportion of female contributors; xe is the earliest entry age into the
pension scheme; x(r)m is the legal retirement age for male workers; A0 is the average
non-contribution periods for people who start working at age xe; βem is the weight of
male workers who start working at age xe; x
(r)
f is the legal retirement age for female
workers; β0f is the weight of female workers who stop working after marriage; x
0
f is the
average age when female workers stop working after marriage, and βef is the weight of
female workers who start working at age xe.
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Appendix G
Illustration of Cohort Component
Method
Figure G.1 illustrates the process of the cohort component method. The first step is
to estimate the population census at year t, i.e. N(t). The second step calculates the
total number of new births during year t, B(t), by taking into account the fertility rates
at year t. Then, the survival rates at each age are multiplied to obtain the number of
individuals who survived at year t + 1. Finally, the net migration rates per age are
added in order to calculate the projected population at time t+ 1, i.e. N(t+ 1).
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Figure G.1: Illustration of cohort component method
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Appendix H
Survival Rates for China
Table H.1 shows the estimated historical survival rates of China over the period 1975-
2015 and Table H.2 shows the projected survival rates of China over the period 2015-
2090, sources are from United Nations (2015). The survival rates of new births has
taken into account the infant mortality at each period.
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